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Research across the world has found that married men, are more likely to participate in the 
labour force, more preferred by employers and earn more their unmarried counterparts. 
Whereas for women, studies found that it is the unmarried women who participate more in 
the labour market, get employed and earn more than married women.  Using the 2008 
Integrated Labour Force Survey, the study aims is to analyse and estimate the effect that 
marital status has on one’s labour market participation decision, likelihood of finding 
employment and level of earnings in Lesotho. This topic is deemed important because it 
gives some insight into the male-female differentials in labour market attachment and wages 
in Lesotho. It has been hypothesised in the literature that part of the wage differential 
observed between men and women can be attributed to the specialisation in gender roles by 
married men and women. This study thus evaluates this literature in the context of the 
Lesotho’s labour market. The study extensively test a number of hypotheses that have been 
developed in the literature to explain the relationship between marital status, employment 
and earnings. The hypotheses are that (1) marriage increases labour force participation, 
(perhaps employment) and earnings for males but (2) marriage decreases labour force 
participation, (perhaps employment) and earnings for females. In order to test these 
hypotheses, probit models were used to estimate the determinants of labour force 
participation and employment, as well as using interval regression to estimate earnings 
equations amongst the employed. Results shows that though marital status plays a role in 
labour market attachment and wages, not all marital categories were important in 
determining participation, employment and earnings. This suggests that there are other 
important factors which determine labour market outcomes other than marital status. 
Educational, household, age and occupational variables were also found to be important in 
the determination of the three stages of the labour market. However, in all the three stages 
monogamous marriage was the one that was significant for both men and women in 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
Up until the early 1970s, studies that looked at labour market determinants, patterns and 
characteristics mainly concentrated on the developed countries. It is through the theoretical 
and conceptual frameworks of these studies that a platform was created for subsequent 
studies to be carried out in developing countries from the early 1970s onwards. This shift in 
focus was largely initiated by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Fadayomi and 
Ogunrinola, 2005). In labour economics one of the long-established yet unresolved questions 
has been on whether marriage causes the rise in the wages of men. Studies using cross-
sectional data on wages have consistently found that married men tend to earn significantly 
greater wages than those who are currently not married (Antonovics and Town, 2003). This 
dissertation therefore sets out to examine what impact marital status has on the labour market 
outcomes for men and women in Lesotho, a country where no such studies currently exist. 
There are various reasons why this topic of marital status and labour market activity is of great 
interest, and particularly for a small unknown and under-developed country. One key reason 
is to enhance the understanding of the labour supply patterns of men and women, as this will 
be crucial in understanding the distribution of the labour force for policy formulation. A second 
reason is to contribute to knowledge about gendered patterns of social and economic 
behaviour, which is an under-researched area in developing countries. 
Marital status has an important effect on demographic and economic variables. One’s marital 
behaviour has the ability to affect a number of key factors in a country. For instance, marital 
status has an impact on the population growth rate, supply of labour, wage rates and migration 
(Keeley, 1979). Existing research has also emphasized the advantages that are associated 
with marriage: researchers have found that marriage has a positive impact on one’s health 
and level of happiness. Marital status has also been found to have an effect on the 
participation, employment and earnings for both men and women (Bardasi and Taylor, 2008). 
Economic activity in Lesotho historically used to be dependent on remittances from Basotho 
working in South African mines and on receipts from the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU). However, in recent years retrenchments of mine workers due to the shrinking mine 
sector and declines in SACU revenues have necessitated substantial changes in the economic 
structure (Ketso, 2013). Unemployment, currently stands at 25.3 percent, is among the biggest 
challenges facing Lesotho. There are also major gender imbalances in the labour market, with 
72.6 percent of men but only 55.3 percent of women participating in the labour force (Bureau 
of Statistics, 2008). Some of these inequalities may be a result of attitudes towards traditional 
gender roles. This dissertation therefore sets out to examine what impact marital status has 





Labour market participation rates in Lesotho, as is the case in many other countries, show that 
men tend to participate in the labour market more than women (Bureau of Statistics, 2008). 
Further, the distribution of employment in the country is such that the private sector is the 
largest sector that provides employment. It contributes 30 percent of the total national 
employment. This is followed by the private sector household employment which contributes 
22 percent, the public sector employs 5.5 percent, 1.6 percent is contributed by parastatals, 
and 22 percent is contributed by the informal sector (Bureau of Statistics, 2008). 
Given these employment distribution per sector, unemployment is still among the biggest 
challenges in Lesotho as previously indicated. The macro-economic policies and programmes 
that have been used in the past have not fully addressed ways to promote employment. 
Moreover, the national development strategies in Lesotho do not have employment creation 
as their central objective, which has worsened the unemployment situation in the country 
(Ketso, 2013).  
The two concepts of labour force participation and unemployment will play an important role 
in the study hence it was important that they were discussed. The two go hand-in-hand, as 
when analysing unemployment data it is important to look at participation rates because the 
figures for the unemployed reflect the number of people searching for employment but are 
unable to find a job. 
This dissertation will be the first to attempt to model the effects for marital status of men and 
women on their labour market activity in Lesotho. Specifically, the dissertation will investigate 
the effect of marital status on labour force participation, employment and earnings using cross 
sectional data from the 2008 Integrated Labour Force Survey compiled by the Bureau of 
Statistics Lesotho.  
The study addresses the following specific objectives: 
 How does economic theory account for possible differences in labour market outcomes 
on the basis of marital status? 
 On average, are there differences in labour market participation, employment and 
earnings between individuals with different marital statuses, and if so, do these 
differences vary by gender? 
 To what extent do differences in labour market outcomes by marital status persist, for 






One of the reasons why this topic of marital status, labour force participation, employment and 
earnings is deemed important because it will give some insight into gender behaviour and 
male-female wage differentials in Lesotho. It has been hypothesised that part of the wage 
differential between men and women can be attributed to the specialisation in gender roles by 
married men and women. For instance, it is argued that the hourly earnings of unmarried 
women are greater than married women even when they work similar hours and possess the 
same market capital. The difference is caused the fact that child care and other home activities 
cause married women to look for convenient work that requires less energy but also pays less 
(Koreman and Neumark, 1990).  
This study will also shed light on a number of issues that are of interest to governments. 
Understanding how labour supply responds to socio-economic factors will allow planners to 
anticipate the effects of changes in economic conditions or in government policies. 
Additionally, analysing labour supply, employment and earnings gives important information 
on issues such as the relative return to human capital, as well as contributing to the 
understanding the distribution of income and poverty issues.  
This dissertation consists of five chapters, where the first outlines the aim and objectives of 
the study. Chapter 2 addresses the first specific objective by reviewing the economic theory 
of marriage, including the potential gains from marriage and the existence of a marriage 
market, and its potential impact on labour market outcomes. The chapter also discusses 
existing empirical literature on labour force participation and employment for men and women 
according to their marital status. It further examines how men’s and women’s wages may be 
influenced by their marital status category. Chapter 3 describes the Integrated Labour Force 
Survey data used in the study, the variables of interest and how the sample was constructed. 
It presents descriptive statistics for the sample, indicating how labour market participation, 
employment and earnings differ by marital status and gender. It therefore addresses the 
second specific objective of the study. The fourth chapter outlines the econometric 
methodology, estimates the models and discusses the results obtained. In particular, models 
are estimated for the probability of participating in the labour force, being employed, and for 
the level of earnings, with marital status being the key variable of interest. The models also 
control for sample selection. This chapter thus tackles the last specific objective. The final 
chapter summarises the dissertation and its findings, as well as presenting recommendations 








Chapter Two: Literature Review 
This chapter will outline a wide range of both theoretical and empirical literature relating to the 
effects of marital status on labour market access and outcomes. The theoretical literature will 
look into the theories of the determinants of labour supply and marriage, both of which can be 
seen as search models. The differences between these models are through how they describe 
the search behaviour and the assumptions that they make about the seeker’s time horizon 
and the knowledge s/he has about the conditions in the market before they enter. Individuals 
also have a reservation threshold below which they will not enter the market. In the labour 
market, this is expressed in terms of wages, and in the marriage market it is in terms of utility 
(Gronau, 1974).  
This chapter will begin by reviewing the economic theory of marriage, including the potential 
gains from marriage and the existence of a marriage market, and its potential impact on labour 
force participation. Section 2.2 will review how economic theory describes the factors that 
influence the participation into the labour force both for men and women, and particularly how 
this relates to marital status. These factors will be extended to explain what makes men and 
women employable in the labour market. Section 2.3 will further examine why marital status 
might influence earnings, and why the effect might differ by gender. In Section 2.4, the paper 
will review the existing empirical research on the effect of marital status on labour force 
participation and earnings. Due to the lack of research done on this study, the main papers 
reviewed will be those from developed countries. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.1 The economic theory of marriage  
A behaviour which was ignored by the economics literature for many years had been that of 
marriage. Marriage can be defined as a partnership for the purpose of joint production and 
consumption. An economic theory to explain marriage was pioneered by Gary Becker in 1973, 
who argued that marriage, like any other behaviour involves the use of scarce resources. 
Marital patterns have an impact on economic aspects such as leisure allocation together with 
other household activities, income inequality, women’s labour market participation, growth in 
population, and the selection of natural genetic characteristics over time. Marriage has also 
been found to have a positive impact on one’s reported happiness and health (Becker, 1973).  
To explain the role that marital status plays in influencing the three economic variables 
earnings, employment and labour force participation, two main principles are put forward. The 
first principal argues that marriage is voluntary to rational people getting married or their 
parents. Thus marriage is subject to the similar tools of economic analysis like other economic 





deciding to get married or their parents beyond their utility level had they chosen to be single 
(Becker, 1973). Economically, marriage is a voluntary action that people decide to undertake 
so as to have joint production and consumption. Therefore, marriage is comparable to other 
goods and services in the market, as people also seek to maximise their utility subject to 
market constraints (Weiss, 1997). However, it can be also be debated that the desires of 
children and their parents do not always coincide, which could mean that parents may or may 
not affect the household decision making and labour market decision particularly post 
marriage for their children (Dauphin et al., 2008).    Secondly, men and women contend when 
they try to find their suitable partner, which can imply that a marriage market exists. The aim 
of each individual is then to find the best partner, subject to the constraints that prevail in the 
market though existing conditions (Becker, 1973). It is through these two principles that one 
can explain why a large number of adults get married.  
2.1.1 The gains from marriage 
Further, to understand why individuals decide to enter into marriage, it is important to 
understand the economic gains of being married as opposed to being single (Weiss, 1997). 
The first potential gain is that of children. One of the main reasons that people marry is to have 
a complete family. Even though in recent times children are often born and raised outside 
marriage, family still has an advantage in child bearing and raising activities. One advantage 
of having a family is that parents will care for their own children. It is through this mutual interest 
that is efficient for parents to determine how much to spend on their children. Children can be 
seen as a public good to parents, so an efficient allocation of resources of the family will need 
cooperation between the parents for private and public uses. Moreover, children can be 
viewed as assets since it is believed that they will provide continuity of the family from one 
generation to another for personal immortality. Further, they are seen as social and financial 
support systems for their parents in the later years of their life (Neal et al., 1989).  However, if 
the parents are living separately there will not necessarily be coordination on the expenditure 
on the child (Weiss, 1997). 
The second advantage of marriage is labour division, where family members match their 
labour market activities so as to benefit from areas where they have a comparative advantage 
and increasing returns. For example, one partner can be engaged in the labour force and the 
other in home production. This can be economically efficient when there is a difference 
between the partners in potential market earnings or in household productivity. Each one can 
be able to specialise in the activity where they are most productive (Weiss, 1997). 
Thirdly, marriage also allows for resource sharing. For instance, two married people can 





of non-rival goods like household expenditure. Another advantage is of credit and investment. 
Married couples can jointly take upon a loan for investment purposes. For example, one 
partner can work while one invests in human capital in the form of schooling, and future returns 
from this investment will be shared by the couple. Lastly, there is a pooling of risk in the family. 
The risk is spread across the household should any idiosyncratic shock happen to any 
member of the household. This can happen in instances where, one partner works while the 
other is unemployed or ill (Weiss, 1997).  
2.1.2 The marriage market 
Marriage can be seen to have its own market which is comparable to any other market.  It can 
be argued that there is a mutual dependence between marriage and the labour market. The 
decision one makes on their marital status can be translated into labour market terms because 
marriages are seen as exchanges of household labour. This labour benefits an individual’s 
potential or actual spouse with responsibilities such as cooking, taking care of children, 
gardening or counselling. This type of labour is carried out for a longer period than an individual 
would spend on such activities if they were living alone. Traditionally, men are seen as 
demanders of women’s household labour and women supply the household labour 
(Grossbard-Shechtman, 1984). 
The marriage market is used to show that the pairing of the human population is highly 
systematic and structured. There is a wide range of potential partners to choose from. This 
creates competition for a potential partner and for the gains from marriage (Weiss, 1997). 
When an efficient marriage market exists, it will develop shadow prices that guide those 
participating to get married and be able to maximise their expected utility (Becker, 1981). 
People will then decide to marry if and only if their expected utility of being married is greater 
than if they had chosen to not get married. Equilibrium in the marriage market requires that 
there are the same number of women and men that want to marry, and that those participating 
that remain single should have an income as large as they would have had they decided to 
get married (Becker, 1981). 
To understand the marriage market and also to account for the incomplete information that 
prevails in the marriage market, the analysis of matching and search models is used. Matching 
models aim to outline the preferences of prospective matches in forming a stable assignment. 
This supports the assumption that marriage is voluntary. Therefore, an assignment will be 
stable if there is no married individual who prefers to rather be single and no two people, either 
married or unmarried prefer to form a new union. The matching process is characterised by 
information about potential matches being scarce. While this matching takes place, 





marriage and the distribution of matches can be portrayed through equilibrium, influenced by 
search costs and other participants’ search policies (Weiss, 1997).  
The gains that one obtain from marriage depend on the combination of each mate’s 
characteristics. For instance, the gains to marriage can depend on the earnings and human 
capital that each spouse has, and their relative wage rates. Therefore, since these gains arise 
because of a combination of the other spouse’s and one’s own characteristics, single 
individuals will expand their resources so as to find a suitable partner by searching (Keeley, 
1974; Keeley, 1979). 
The search model can be characterised in two ways. Firstly, a single individual makes a 
decision on whether or not to enter in the marriage market and use resources searching for a 
partner. Secondly, if the individual chooses to enter into the marriage market, then an optimal 
sequential search is pursued for a partner. Searching for a partner can be similar to searching 
for employment. One goes into the market to search for a partner. If the gains exceed the 
costs then the person searching will have a reservation offer in which to accept. This 
reservation offer is where the benefits of searching for a partner equal or exceed the cost of 
searching. This is determined by equating the expected marginal benefits from searching to 
the marginal cost. Thus, only marriage offers which equal or are greater than the reservation 
offer will be accepted by the searcher (Keeley, 1974; Keeley, 1979). 
However, marital formations differ according to different societies and they tend to change 
over time. In some nations the rate of divorce is high, in others divorce rates are growing at 
an escalating rate, while in other countries divorce is still impossible. The nature of the 
marriage process also differs according to culture, where in some societies a bride brings a 
dowry, in other places the groom pays a bridal fee, while others marry because of the love 
between them and disregard any financial bargaining (Becker, 1973).  
Many African countries practice the tradition of a bridal wealth where the prospective groom 
has to pay a fee to the bride’s family, and this is the only way in which a marriage can be 
validated. Lesotho, like many other countries including South Africa, still practices this 
tradition. Due to their proximity and cross-cultural practices, the tradition of bridal wealth 
practice in Lesotho and South Africa are very similar, and because of lack of data for Lesotho, 
most of the reference will be made using South African data. There are two legal systems 
regarding marriage that exist in Lesotho. These systems are the civil and customary law, the 
latter of which is the dominant in most marriages in the country since the Marriage Act of 1974 
till to-date. For marriage under customary law to be deemed complete, it requires that there 





parents of the parties on the marriage and amount of the bridal fee (bohali), and lastly there is 
a payment of a portion or the full fee (Poulter, 1977).  
One of the main reasons why there is a custom to pay a bridal fee is so as to provide the 
parents of the daughter with a compensation for the loss of the productive and reproductive 
labour power of their child. This exchange also expresses a commitment to a future reciprocal 
relationship between the family of the bride and the groom (Posel and Rudwick, 2012). 
Customary marriages for Basotho are potentially polygamous. A man has an option to enter 
into other marriages but he is required to consult with his other wives, and this depends on 
the overall needs of the family. Each wife in a polygamous marriage has her own property in 
a form of a house (Legal Resources Centre, 2011).   
Traditionally, the customary marriage used to happen through the method of elopement of the 
bride from her home. She would then be kept at the groom’s home overnight. Thereafter, the 
parents would reach an agreement to consent to the union. The common practice was that 
both families agree on the bridal fee (bohali), which was paid in the form of cattle. The groom’s 
family was then required to present twenty to thirty cows to the bride’s family as a bridal fee. 
It is only after the payment that the bride will officially become part of the family through the 
method called “bekoa” (received and educated as a newly married daughter-in-law) (Poulter, 
1977). 
The tradition of bridal fees being in the form of cattle has changed in recent years. The fee is 
now usually in the form of cash payment. The costs are quite high, relative to household 
incomes, as the groom’s family is required to pay a cash payment equivalent to twenty cows. 
With such high costs, men need to work first before deciding to enter into the marriage market. 
These high bridal fees affect the rates of marriage and lead to other forms of partnerships that 
require no fees, such as cohabiting (Juma, 2011). Studies have shown that the traditional 
practice of bridal wealth has now become commercialised as it now acquires more of an 
economic imperative. Although there are not national data collected in Lesotho on bride wealth 
payment, the average amount paid is approximately 6 to 10 cows, amounting to about R15 
000 to R30 000 which is not very different from that paid in neighbouring South Africa. This is 
roughly two to three times the average monthly earnings of a man working in the public sector 
in Lesotho who earns roughly R8 000 (Casale and Posel, 2010; Juma, 2011).  
The second observed changed is that the payments have become individualised. In the past, 
the bridal fee payments were done by drawing from the herd of cattle belonging to the father 
of the prospective husband, but now particularly in urban areas payments are made in cash 





The introduction of civil marriage under the Marriage Act of 1974 has also given people an 
alternative to deal with the high cost of marriage. Further, the respect and importance of 
traditional culture among young men and women has declined. Marriage can thus now be 
deemed complete even without having complied with the customary law requirements (Juma, 
2011).  
For those still believing in the customary law, it is be expected that due to the bridal fee 
practises in Lesotho, mostly high earning men would get married, rather than low earning or 
unemployed men. This would mean that labour market outcomes form a constraint in the 
marriage market. Those who are cohabiting would be expected to earn less than married men, 
as these forms of unions are not as stable as marriage, and require lower specialisation 
(Casale and Posel, 2010). Due to the lack of data on this issue of bridal wealth in Lesotho, the 
discussion will not be furthered more in the following sections. These relationships between 
marital status and labour market status are discussed in more detail in the next sections. 
2.2 Theory of labour force participation 
The model of labour supply is developed in this section. This basic theoretical framework 
entails the leisure-labour choice model. The same framework can be applied to both 
participation and hours worked dimensions. For the purpose of this study, two separate 
aspects of labour supply. The first will be labour supply measured by working hours and the 
second aspect will cover labour force participation, (Blundell, 1995). 
Labour is one of the most abundant factors of production and it can be concluded that in the 
long-run the well-being of a country primarily depends on the people’s willingness and ability 
to work. There is a heavy reliance on the production of goods and services from market 
activities required for any economy to sustain itself. Although there are other ways in which 
individuals can spend their time without being involved in work for pay, such as home 
production or consumption of leisure. The decision to participate in the labour market is 
ultimately a decision on how to spend time. People either spend their time on pleasurable 
leisure activities or use the time to work. Furthermore, when someone decides to work, they 
choose between home production and working for pay in market related activities (Ehrenberg 
and Smith, 2009). 
Labour force participation rates give an indication of the extent to which the population that is 
in the working-age groups are in the labour force by participating in, being available for paid 
work or self-employment. The decision to participate in the labour force for the working-age 
adults is one of the key determinants of the actual size of the labour force, the unemployment 





rate is also important when forecasting macroeconomic and labour market performances. 
Further, it has a major implication for the distribution of income as those who do not participate 
in the labour force do not have direct access to income yielded from the labour market. 
However, they may have indirect access through the other members of the family. Alterations 
in the participation patterns are often expected to result in changes in the demands placed on 
other forms of income support (Dixon, 1996).  
When analysing the labour force participation, theory argues that when it comes to married 
women, the decision to participate is three-fold, and therefore cannot be only looked at in 
terms of time allocation between leisure and market activities. Household work is a third 
activity to which married women may devote their time. Married women are thus faced with 
choices between leisure, household work and working in the market (Mincer, 1962). The 
choice that a woman makes among these activities is generally influenced by both her family 
and her own abilities. The woman will decide to participate in the labour market after looking 
at her family resources and her own potential earnings. If the family resources are high, it will 
hinder the woman’s involvement in the labour force. For example, if the husband’s earnings 
are high, it will lead to low participation chances of the woman into the market (Lee, 1997). 
The greater the demand in the household the more likely the woman is to stay at home. 
However, if these home activities can be substituted in the form of maids, dishwashers and 
other electric appliance, then the woman is likely to participate less in household production 
and more in the labour market. Such a division of time will be reached after comparing the 
cost of household production to the earnings that could be available in the market. She will 
thus choose to be in a place where she will be more productive (Lee, 1997). The neoclassical 
theory of time allocation is used as one of the main theories to explain an individual’s labour 
supply decisions. The individual makes a decision on whether to consume more goods or to 
consume more leisure (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). Moreover, the theory states that an 
individual values their time according to preferences that maximise their utility. For an 
individual to make their decision on whether to participate in the labour market or not, they 
compare the value of the time they would spend in the labour market to the value derived from 
participating in non-labour market activities. The chosen activity will be the one with the highest 
value. The value of the labour market activities is measured using the prevailing wage rate in 
the market, whereas the value of non-labour market activities is determined by the preferences 
and tastes of the individual. The other determinants are the demands placed on an individual’s 
non-labour market time, which includes things such as number of children and number of 
dependents in the family, and the non-labour market income. Traditionally, women are seen 
as caretakers of households and thus the value put on household activities tends to be higher 





argues shapes an individual’s choice to participate in the labour market is the amount of one’s 
human capital. (Guven-Lisaniler and Bhatti, 2004). The theory of human capital states that 
individuals invest in education and training in the current period so that they can have higher 
returns in the future. In the labour market, this means that people acquire education and job 
specific training, which will mean that in the future, their labour market earnings are going to 
be higher. Further, those with more human capital (education and training) are more likely to 
participate in the labour market as their earnings prospects are now attractive (Ehrenberg and 
Smith, 2009).  
In addition, to making a choice on how to allocate time so as to maximise one’s utility at a 
given wage, they also make the choice of time allocation between leisure and work in response 
to increases in wages. If it is assumed that leisure time is a normal good, then an increase in 
the wage rate will lead to a negative income because the demand for leisure increases while 
that of work declines. Further, an increase in income will lead to a positive substitution effect: 
when income rises, one will allocate more time to work as opposed to leisure (Mincer, 1962). 
The idea here is that the substitution and income effects work in opposite directions. Either of 
the effects can dominate, and it is often thought that the substitution effect will dominate at 
lower wages. Therefore, an increase in wages increases labour supply. The income effect 
dominates at higher wages, where a wage increase reduces labour supply (Cahuc and 
Zylberberg, 2004).  Furthermore, the fraction of time allocated to either work or leisure given 
the change in the wage rate will depend on the relative value that is placed on the additional 
income and on leisure by each individual (Fadayomi and Oguntinola, 2005).  
Working is viewed as a bad which is necessary so as to create income needed for 
consumption. Therefore, the neoclassical theory of labour supply is based on the trade-off 
between consumption and leisure where an individual is faced with limited time which they 
can allocate to leisure and work. The optimal choice of labour supply is where an individual 
maximises utility. This accounts for the fact that when one decides to work it means a reduction 
in leisure time, which translates to utility loss caused by working (Ratzel, 2009). 
Another way to look at labour supply is to consider the role that family plays. However, it may 
prove to be complicated to estimate models of family labour supply because there are personal 
characteristics that affect factors such as the formation of marriage and the stability of a 
marriage, which are likely to be related to factors that determine the supply of labour. This has 
proven to be a problem if the way in which individuals are sorted into households is not random 
(Lundberg, 1998). 
However, in almost all societies family is central not only in the coordination of consumption 





This approach of analysing labour force participation at family level was developed mainly due 
to the increased participation in the labour market by married women. The neoclassical theory 
on labour supply states that the observed increase in the number of women entering the 
market is because of the increase in the market wage opportunities for women or their 
opportunity cost of the time they spend in non-market activities. The other reason for using 
this approach is that in standard economic theory, the analysis of the supply of labour to the 
market is in terms of consumption theory, which shows that there is some form of joint decision 
that households undertake. The outcome of this decision often leads to women supplying their 
labour in home production rather than market activities (Mincer, 1962). 
However, it may be the case that instead of an individual maximising his or her own utility, 
there is some sort of joint decision-making that happens so as to decide on how time will be 
allocated by each member of the household. What often occurs is that partners find it 
beneficial for each to specialise in the work that has to be done either in the market or at home. 
Often it is found that one partner bears more responsibility in work or household activities than 
the other partner (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2009). Further, the neoclassical model of the family 
presumes that families behave as if they are trying to allocate the members’ time and other 
endowment so as to satisfy the common set of family preferences. This is assumed to be 
possible by pooling resources and agreeing on the joint preferences (Schultz, 1990).  
The standard neoclassical model of labour supply including the family framework was 
formulated to explain the labour market behaviours of developed countries. It excludes the 
fact that developing countries labour markets are formulated differently (Rosenzweig, 1980). 
For instance, there are societies which are impoverished and survive on agricultural activities 
and child labour, which are mainly unskilled but which remain valuable to family resources. 
The neoclassical theory also predicts how adult men’s wage rates and child wage rates are 
both positively related to fertility and negatively to the time allocated to production in the market 
by women (Schultz, 1990). 
 
2.3 Marital status and earnings 
There are a variety of theoretical reasons why earnings might differ by marital status. This 
section considers these reasons, and why they might differ by gender, while the section that 
follows examines the empirical evidence. 
2.3.1 Men 
Many established studies on cross-sectional wage and income determination have shown that 





Ross, 1982; Cohen and Haberfeld, 1991) and these studies will be reviewed further in sections 
2.4.2. There are two theoretical hypotheses that have been put forward to explain the 
premiums of marital earnings. The main hypothesis is proposed by Becker (1973), and it is 
based on the household production and time allocation models. It argues that married men 
are more productive than unmarried men. What marriage does, is to allow for economies of 
scale in household production which leads to labour specialisation. Men thus tend to specialise 
in market activities and women in household production. This causes married men to 
accumulate more human capital in market activities compared to single men, which translates 
to increased productivity and wages (Casale and Posel, 2010). 
To further explain the observed positive relationship between the earnings of men and marital 
status, it requires that one classifies whether it is due to the wives’ effect on the wages of their 
husbands in the labour market or it is because of the process of matching that occurs in the 
marriage market (Cohen and Heberfeld, 1991). 
The effect that wives have on the wages of their husband could be one of many reasons why 
employers reward married men with higher wage premiums. Others maintain that there is a 
response by employers to the actual increase in productivity that is caused by the wife’s 
existence. Wives are argued to improve the decision making process in the household, 
motivate their husband’s to place more effort into their jobs, provide emotional support  and 
advice on matters relating to the job, as well as performing duties that are directly related to 
the job of the husband (Cohen and Heberfeld, 1991). 
Further, marriage also creates conditions in which human capital accumulation becomes more 
efficient for married men than it would for someone who is not married. This means that 
marriage increases the time one has available to invest in human capital specific to the market. 
Alternatively, a wife can contribute directly to her husband’s human capital through the supply 
of flow services in the form of helping to finance the accumulation of human capital because 
the wife may be working (Bardasi and Taylor, 2008). Given these explanations of the effect 
that wives have on the earnings of their husbands, it would then be expected that divorce, 
separation or death of the wife should lead to a decline in the earnings of the husband. There 
would no longer be a wife enhancing the productivity of the husband which would translate 
into a decline in his performance at work and hence a decline in earnings (Cohen and 
Heberfeld, 1991). 
An alternative hypothesis for the marital wage premium involves the matching process in the 
marriage market. This hypothesis states that, there is a selection of men into marriage due to 
individual characteristics that are unobservable. These characteristics are also seen to be 





that are highly valued in both the labour market and the marriage market include among others 
ability, attitude, self-esteem, congeniality, loyalty, honesty, dependability, leadership, 
industriousness, and even physical appearance (Casale and Posel, 2010). Another 
explanation is that men who are not married and remain single might do so because women 
accurately think that they will not achieve economic success. Therefore, high earning men are 
more likely to get married as they are more attractive in the marriage market than other men. 
This could mean that it is possible for the wages of men to affect the propensity to get married 
and divorced (Gwartney and Stroup, 1973).  
Another phenomenon that may explain this observation is that of discrimination and market 
signalling. Employers may discriminate in favour of married men, not necessarily because 
they are more productive but mainly because married men are seen to be more stable and 
responsible as they have a family to support. Unmarried men on the other hand are seen to 
be in lesser financial need. In some instances, employers view marriage as an indicator for 
higher productivity because marriage is related with unobservable characteristics such as 
capability, trustworthiness, reliability, dependability and determination. This discrimination 
would be observed when employers determine promotions and raises. They may decide to 
discriminate against unmarried men: employers may view unmarried man as more likely to 
job-hop than married men as they are less stable (Cohen and Heberfeld, 1991; Bardasi and 
Taylor, 2008). 
These explanations for why married men earn more than unmarried ones can be challenged. 
Specialisation theory has been argued to be the main driving force to explain wage differences 
between never married and married individuals. However, with shifting cultures, this could 
change. For instance, in recent years household activities have their own market. An 
unmarried man no longer has to clean his own house or do laundry, but rather he has an 
opportunity to hire a maid, or can always decide to eat at restaurants. Moreover, on average 
income levels have increased, and this allows people to outsource home activities to the 
market (Cohen, 1998; Kist and Hu, 2010).  
Furthermore, more women, married and unmarried, now spend more time in the work place 
than in the past due to increased financial and social benefits, and changes in gender roles. 
This means that the specialisation that was previously observed does not happen to the same 
extent, so the gains from specialisation are likely to have decreased. Also, many societies are 
experiencing an increase in the number of women who are the higher earners in marriages. 
With this comparative advantage that some women have, men would spend more time 
specialising in household related activities than in market activities and human capital 





earning premium due to the decline in market specialisation (Killewald and Gough, 2010; Kist 
and Hu, 2010). 
One further observation is the increased divorce rates over time: these might cause people 
not to specialise because they know they are likely to end up single again and would resume 
working in the market and at home. This means that divorce will have a negative effect on 
gains from specialisation. However, studies have not intensively estimated the effect that a 
divorce has on men’s wages.  When a divorce occurs men become great financial need as 
there are usually in the financial implications to both parties when divorce settlements in 
process, (Pfeffer and Ross, 1982; Kist and Hu, 2010). The signalling hypothesis likewise would 
not necessarily result in a decline in the wages of a man after a divorce as the employer would 
have already gathered enough information on the performance of the man. This means that 
employers will not rely on marital status as a signal for the particular worker’s performances 
(Pfeffer and Ross, 1982; Cohen and Heberfeld, 1991).  
2.3.2 Women 
In contrast to men, most research finds that unmarried women earn more than married women 
(Goldin and Polachek, 1987; Korenman and Neumark, 1992). Studies show that when women 
delay the age at which they get married, this increases their earnings. Unmarried women may 
be more dedicated to building their careers over their lifetime.  
One theory which can explain why married women earn lower than unmarried women is the 
human capital theory by Becker (1985). The theory predicts that married women spend more 
time outside the labour market and more involved in activities such as childbearing and 
childrearing. It is this loss in labour market experience that explains the wage gap between 
married women and other women. This is argued to be the case as married women are more 
likely than unmarried women to have children and household duties which take them off the 
labour market (Waldfogel, 1997).  
The theories that explain how marriage affects male wages apply differently to women. Firstly, 
marriage has a different signal to employers when women than men apply for employment. 
Employers may discriminate against married woman in favour of unmarried ones. Employers 
may believe that married women have other additional household responsibilities which will 
interfere with their work. Another reason for this discrimination is that married women are more 
likely to leave the labour market to have children than women who are not married (Chiodo 





Secondly, marriage may not make women more productive in the labour market. Rather, they 
may spend more time in household production than unmarried women, which leads to lower 
wages. The specialisation of married women in this case is thus shifted to building a home. 
Further, it has been found in empirical research that regardless of whether a woman is 
employed, she still spends time on household chores (Chiodo and Owyang, 2003; Gupta, 
2006). 
However, there is an alternative way in which the relationship between the marital status and 
earnings of women can be explained. There are three parts to this explanation. Firstly, it can 
be argued that those women who decide to get married are different than those who do not, 
and that these differences are correlated with the earnings of women or their growth in wages. 
This suggests that there is no causal relationship between women’s earnings and family 
status. Instead, this is a selection based argument. If women’s selection into marriage 
happens in a similar manner to that of men, it could be possible that women who are married 
also possess unobserved characteristics which will make them valuable to employers and 
their potential marriage partners. However, for women a marriage premium is not observed, 
which could mean that the unobserved characteristics only make women attractive in the 
marriage market, such as commitment to family life, and not in the labour market. Secondly, it 
can be argued that when women experience a transition in their marital status, this could alter 
their earnings through a productivity alteration. It is however observed that, when women get 
married they increase their participation in non-market activities, which would reduce their 
productivity and hence earnings. It is also argued that there are other factors that can change 
one’s productivity other than through specialisation, such as increased motivation. Women 
may also be able to leverage the social and human capital of their husbands so as to receive 
increased wages (Killewald and Gough, 2010).  
Lastly, theory has long argued that the relationship among married individuals and their 
earnings may be due to discrimination mainly against married women. Existing literature 
shows that employers discriminate against mothers because they are seen to be less 
productive (Goldin, 1988; Waldfogel, 1998). This means that married women will be 
discriminated against as employers can perceive them as potential mothers. However, some 
employers may not take to heart the marital status of women. Additionally, governments may 
have policies which help protect women in the labour market, and thus prevent discrimination 
on the basis of marital status (Killewald and Gough, 2010). Therefore, the effect of marital 
status on wages for women, if any effect exists, is less clear in theory than it is for men, and 






2.4 Empirical literature on marital status and economic outcomes 
The previous two sections examined why labour force participation and earnings might differ 
by marital status. However, the direction of the effect was not always theoretically clear, 
especially in the case of women. This section therefore reviews empirical studies on these 
relationships. 
2.4.1 Labour force participation  
Various studies have shown that participation behaviour and its determinants differ 
systematically by gender, age, and that changes in participation rates for different groups 
therefore affect aggregate participation through changes in demographics. Naturally, 
participation behaviour varies also across other personal characteristics, such as marital 
status, education and skills, and immigrant status (Balleer et al., 2009). Empirical studies of 
this relationship usually produce their findings either by comparing aggregate estimates of 
participation rates across different demographic groups, or by estimating participation at the 
individual level using logit or probit analysis. 
 
There have been substantial changes over time in the patterns and rates of labour force 
participation across the world. The participation rates of young people have declined while 
there have been increases in the participation rates of workers between the ages of 60 to 64. 
For the adults in their prime-aged years between 24 and 54, the participation rate for men who 
are actively engaged in the labour market has fallen, while for women in the same age group 
increased their participation rates (Dixon, 1996; Balleer et al., 2009).  
Historical studies enable an understanding of how labour market behaviour has changed over 
time. In her study of understanding the gender gap that existed in the labour force of the United 
State, Goldin (1990) stated that in the 1900s married women did not work. Therefore, an 
employed married woman in the 1900s was an indication that her husband was not able to 
adequately provide for the family. What was also observed during this period was women 
worked were single or never married and they were mostly employed in low paying jobs such 
as domestic servants, manufacturing or agricultural sectors. However, in the 1950s, as the 
level of education for women improved, it raised their employment and varied job 
opportunities. It was then possible for women to work regardless of their marital status and 
their value for labour market time increased. Further, married men had a two percent higher 
participation rate than single men, with participation rates for married men being 98 percent. 





when compared to unmarried men. The study revealed that married women had the lowest 
participation rate of 65 percent. 
In the European Union, there has been a decline over time in the gender gap between men 
and women in terms of participation in the labour market. In 1980, the gender gap was roughly 
30 percentage points and by 2000 it halved to 16.7 percent. This was attributed to the rising 
number of women entering the labour market and the decline in employment rates for men, 
particularly older men, (Pissarides et al., 2005) A similar study by Robin and Jacquemet 
(2010), in France, also found that married men participate more in the labour market than 
unmarried ones. The participation of men is however greater than that of both married and 
unmarried women.  
Trends in labour force participation over time appear to favour women in a number of contexts. 
Looking at labour force participation patterns in New Zealand during 1986 to 1996, Dixon 
(1996) found that there was a pro-cyclical movement in the participation rates for both men 
and women. The participation rates fell during the 1986 to 1992 economic downturn and rose 
from 1993 to 1996 due to the economic recovery and the resumption of growth in employment. 
During the recovery process, there was a slow growth in the male labour force participation 
rate which was attributed to the reduction in unemployment which favoured females. The 
decline in unemployment favoured females as their employment and participation rates rose 
drastically.  
The labour force participation by marital status showed that married and cohabiting men were 
more likely to be active participants in the labour force than divorced, separated or single men. 
For women, during 1988 to 1996 the greatest labour force involvement was observed for 
women who were married, cohabiting and those there were previously married. Never married 
women had the highest participation in 1987 but by 1996 their rate had become comparable 
to those of married women. These variations in participation patterns due to marital status 
were argued to be influenced by a number of other demographic characteristics that are 
correlated with marital status. For instance, men in their prime-aged years who have never 
married were on average less qualified in terms of education and experience when compared 
to men who were married, cohabiting or had previously been married (Dixon, 1996). 
Literature for developing countries is less plentiful, but similar results have also been found 
when it comes to participation rates in the labour market. In South Arica between the years 
1995 to 1999, there was an increase in labour force participation rates for both men and 
women. The increase in the male participation rate was lower than that of women because of 





rate was still significantly higher for men than for women. What has increased was the female 
share in the labour force and economically active population (Casale and Posel, 2002). 
When investigating the factors that determine the labour force participation of women in South 
Africa during the period of 1995 to 2004, Ntuli (2007) reported that marriage reduced the 
probability of South African women’s participation in the labour market. Marriage was seen to 
be the biggest determinant of why African women had the lowest participation rates. Being 
divorced induced formerly married women to participate in the labour market.  
Using the Nigerian Labour Market Survey of 2000 to examine how household structures 
influence participation in the labour market, Fadayomi and Ogunrinola (2005) found that 
married men had the highest participation rate of 91.7 percent. For females, the highest 
participation was for women who were heads of household, and this was higher than that of 
married and single women. Single women were found mostly to be young and still attending 
school or living with their parents. 
Differing results were found in the case of Ghana. The marital status of a woman has a positive 
and significant effect on their likelihood of them participating in the labour force. The reason 
for this observation is that in Ghana, unlike many other countries, husbands assist their wives 
financially to that they can engage in a number of economic activities. The household budget 
is shared between the husband and wife, which gives the wife some form of financial 
responsibility to deal with household needs. About 40 percent of women who are married in 
urban locations take part in wholesale and retail activities and 20 percent are engaged in small 
size manufacturing, such as food processing. About 73 percent of married women in the 
Ghanaian rural areas are involved in agricultural and livestock activities (Sackey, 2005). 
The following section will not turn to empirical research on trends in labour supply. In one of 
the earliest studies related to marital status in this field, Gronau (1979) found that in Israel 
married men on average worked longer hours in the labour market than unmarried men. In 
contrast, married women were found to spend more time in household work and less in the 
labour market compared to their unmarried counterparts. The results showed that marriage 
decreased women’s labour supply in the market by an average of 1.5 hours per day while their 
household work increased by two hours a day. Married men were seen to increase their labour 
supply to the market by approximately two hours a day. Further, married individuals were seen 
to enjoy less leisure time than those who were not married and the difference was larger for 
men than for women. The two reasons put forward to explain these differences are the 





More recently, Mozzocco et al (2006) found that in the United States, when they used a model 
that would capture the behaviour of households looking at labour supply, savings and marital 
choice, the results were similar to those in Israel. Looking in particular at labour market supply 
by gender, they found that unmarried women supplied on average 200 more hours per annum 
as compared to married women, conditional on working. For unmarried men, their annual 
labour supply was almost 200 hours lower than married men.  
One other observation was that, although there was an increase in women’s labour supply, 
on average they work fewer hours than men, (Pissarides et al., 2005). When taking into 
account household dynamics, in the United Kingdom it was found that for households with 
children there was an alteration in the labour supply between men and women. When there 
are young children in the house, women are more likely to work part-time while men still work 
full-time, (Pissarides et al., 2005). The same was found in South Africa, where married women 
who had children under the age of 15 increased the hours they spent at home relative to 
women without young children. 
2.4.2 Earnings 
Most of the literature on marital status and earnings focuses on men, and results show that 
married men tend to earn significantly more than men who are not married. The literature on 
the effects of marriage on the wage premium of men dates back to the nineteenth century, 
and results show consistently that married men have an earning advantage (Ahituv and 
Lerman, 2007). Many studies used earnings equations to estimate these effects of marriage. 
Using cross-country data for the 1980s, Schoeni (1995) showed that in the 14 Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries married men had a wage 
advantage. Similar results were also found by Loh (1996) using the decennial census data of 
1940-1980 for the United States, showing not only that a marriage wage premium existed, but 
that it increased from 11 percent in 1959 to 23 percent in 1969. In the early 1990s in the United 
States, the earning differential between married and unmarried men was estimated to be 
between 10 and 30 percent, depending on the methodology and sample used (Korenman and 
Neumark, 1990). Similar results were observed by Antonovics and Town (2004), that marriage 
induced a high wage premium. The wage differential due to marriage was found to range from 
10 to 50 percent depending on the model specification. When taking into account the 
unobserved individual specific earning endowment, the difference was higher than when using 
cross sectional regressions. This wage premium was attributed to discrimination in favour of 
married men, productivity acquired due to marriage, and unobserved characteristics which 
make men more productive in the labour market while also making them attractive in the 





The method by which this relationship between marital status and earnings is estimated differs 
between studies. A few studies trying to estimate the impact that marriage has on earnings 
used panel data so as to take into account the unobserved heterogeneity using random or 
fixed effects. One study that used this method was that of Korenman and Neumark (1991) 
who estimated the log of hourly earnings rates of young white males in the United States 
during the period of 1976 to 1980. The results without fixed effects found that for white men, 
marriage raised earnings by 11 percent, and with fixed effects it was 6 percent. Divorce was 
found to reduce earnings by 2 percent relative to married men. Further, when looking at the 
impact of marriage tenure on earnings, they found that the first 2 years of marriage raised 
earnings by 3 percent and the year after it grew by 1 percent (Korenman and Neumark, 1991).  
Most studies use cross-section wage regression to estimate the effects that marital status has 
on earnings. The results are similar to those of panel data where random or fixed effects are 
applied: married men are found to earn significantly higher wages than those who have never 
been married. Further, the results reveal small or even negligible selection into employment 
which is related to estimates of cross sectional regressions. The difference that is observed 
between studies using cross sectional earnings regressions and those using panel data is on 
how much, if at all, selection bias contributes to the male marriage premium (Ginther and 
Zavodny, 2001). 
Using the 1980 US Census, Ginther and Zavodny (2001), found that married men enjoy a 16 
percent premium over unmarried men, and that selection bias did not play any role in the 
estimate of the earnings premium. Chun and Lee (2001) also found similar results when they 
used 1991 data to estimate why married men earn more. Married men earned on average 
12.4 percent more than their unmarried counterparts. Studies in the United Kingdom show 
similar results to those found in previous US studies. Marriage has a positive and significant 
impact on earnings for men, resulting in an increase of between 9 and 18 percent (Bardasi 
and Taylor, 2008). These results were obtained from a simple OLS regression which ignored 
issues of endogeneity and selection bias. The difference was when it came to men who were 
cohabiting. They also enjoyed increased wages compared to single men, showing that men 
in some form of partnership either legal or not enjoy wage premiums. However, those who are 
married enjoyed the highest return. When controlling for selection bias and endogeneity, the 
results revealed a lower effect of marriage on wages for British men. The effect of marriage 
on earnings dropped from 2 to 4 percent (Bardasi and Taylor, 2008).  
Evidence from South Africa, using cross sectional data from the South African Labour Force 
Survey of 2004, also shows supporting results. Men who cohabit earned significantly higher 





it was a slightly lower premium than men currently married (Casale and Posel, 2010). Married 
men on average earned 54 percent more than unmarried men when the authors did not control 
for any other characteristics. It was argued that one of the reason for this difference between 
the earnings of married and unmarried men was because of discrimination from employers in 
favour of married males. However, the results revealed that self-employed men who are 
married on average earn 29 percent more than unmarried men who have the same 
characteristics (Casale and Posel, 2010). 
Casale and Posel (2010) also discussed the role played by bridal wealth which is a tradition 
practiced in South Africa, particularly by Africans to validate traditional marriages. This means 
that selection will be very important in explaining the earning premium associated with 
marriage and that it will likely account for a larger share of the marital earning premium in 
South Africa, compared to studies of other countries. They predicted that men with 
characteristics that are unobserved which are valued in the labour market are likely to be able 
to afford bridal wealth and hence get married. The bridal wealth payments may be a constraint 
to marriage, such that only high earning men would be the ones more likely to get married. 
They would be able to accumulate or borrow for the payment quicker than men with lower 
earning profiles.  
Further, there is a significant difference in earnings that would be expected between married 
and those that are not married or cohabiting (Casale and Posel, 2010). This was supported 
by Loh (1996) and Stratton (2002) who found that as much as there was a wage premium for 
cohabiting men in the US, it was half that of married men. The reason could be that cohabiting 
relationships are not stable in most cases and lack of specialization because financial 
responsibilities of the household are shared more equally by the household (Casale and Posel, 
2010). Budlender et al. (2004) also found that cohabitation patterns were most common 
among black South Africans, as it was seen as the best alternative for those who could not 
afford bridal wealth payments. 
In contrast, the literature on the relationship between the earnings of women and marriage is 
much less developed than that of men. Early research in this area found very little or no 
relationship. Dolton and Makepeace (1987) argued that there were no significant differences 
in the earnings of married and unmarried women in the US and concluded that women’s 
marital status is not an important factor in the determination of women’s earnings. However, 
marital status is important in determining their participation decision. When adjustments were 
made on the status of the family, such as the number of children, the characteristics of a job 





Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics of 1976, Hill (1979) found that there was no 
significant relationship between marriage and earnings. However, when she controlled for 
human capital characteristics and the number of children, white married women earned more 
than women who were not married. Interesting results were that women who were divorced, 
separated or widowed earned the most. Similar results were found by Budig and England 
(2001) using the 1982-1993 National Longitudinal Survey for Youth. When they controlled for 
job, human capital and family characteristics, the marriage premium for women was about4 
percent. Also, they found that divorced, separated and widowed women earned more than 
those who were unmarried or married. Goldin and Polachek (1987), on the contrary found 
different results. They used the Census U.S data of 1980 and found that women who were 
single earned more than married women.  
Studies in Europe also show evidence of the relationship between earnings and marital status. 
When analysing cross-sections that are repeated for women in Britain using the 1971 and 
1975 General Household Surveys, the mean hourly wage differential was 45 percent in 1971 
and 42 percent in 1975 in favour of single women. When the earning equations estimates are 
separated by marital status only 3 to 12 percent of these differentials were due to unexplained 
differences in the job and workers characteristics (Greenhalgh, 1980). Siebert and Sloane 
(1981) reported a 10 to 25 percent yearly wage differential favouring women who have never 
been married. When controlling for the attributes of the worker, the differential declined 
substantially. Moreover, when the presence of children under 12 was accounted for, the 
authors did not find it to have any relation to the earnings of married women that worked. 
Moore and Wilson (1982) looked at the relationship between earnings and having children, for 
women who are married, working full-time and between the ages of 35 to 49 using the NLS 
Women Data of 1972. When controlling for other characteristics of a worker, women who had 
three or more children and were married had 11 percent lower earnings per hour than other 
married women who did not have children. For those with fewer children, there was no 
significant difference in wages among women. 
Lastly, Waldfogel (1997) extends the examination of the relationship between marital status 
and women to look at the effect of motherhood on earnings, using US data from 1968 to1988. 
First, the study established that married and divorced women experienced gains in earnings 
as compared to single women. However, the study goes on to show that women with children 
earn less than those without children. The existence of children reduces the earnings of 
women, as they usually take time off the labour market (Waldfogel, 1997). This could suggest 
that although marriage increases women’s earnings, similarly to men’s, this effect is counter-






This chapter, reviewed a wide range of both theoretical and empirical literature on the impact 
of marital status on labour market outcomes, particularly labour force participation and 
earnings. Much of the literature treats labour force participation as synonymous with 
employment, as when someone participates in the market as opposed to home production it 
is assumed that they are employed. However, due to high rates of unemployment in Lesotho, 
this study will consider labour force participation and employment sequentially, and examine 
the effects of marital status on both outcomes.  
The neoclassical theory of labour supply reviewed here explains how individuals decide 
between participating in the labour market and consuming leisure, and why when examining 
women, the theory is extended to include time spent in home production. Moreover, the 
decision regarding labour force participation can be made in a family context, as a joint 
decision by members of the household, in which one partner may specialise in market work 
and the other in home production. On average, the empirical literature shows that married men 
supplied more hours in the labour market than unmarried men. With women, single women 
were the ones who in most cases had the highest supply of labour in the labour market.  
The literature on marital status and its relationship to earnings argues that a combination of 
increased productivity, specialisation and discrimination contribute to the widely-observed 
differentials in earnings among married and single men. With women, however, the theoretical 
direction of the effect of marital status on earnings is more difficult to predict. In addition, any 
positive effect of marriage on earnings similar to that of men may be offset by childbearing 
and rearing. In general, although empirical results are somewhat mixed, marriage is found to 
reduce earnings for women.  
In summary, across a wide range of studies, marital status was found to have a significant 
effect on labour market outcomes for both men and women. However, there is currently no 
existing evidence on the relationship between marital status and economic outcomes in 










Chapter three: Data Description, Sample Construction and Descriptive Statistics  
The previous chapter discussed the theory of how the economic behaviour of men and women 
might differ according to their marital status, based on the pioneering work of Gary Becker 
(1973). This issue was deemed important as it has implications on the growth of a population, 
income inequality, one’s capabilities, labour force participation, time allocation between work 
and household activities just to mention a few (Becker, 1973).  
A wide variety of empirical research, particularly in developed countries, has sought to 
measure the effects of marriage on labour market outcomes, such as labour force participation 
and earnings. They suggest that married women are less likely to participate in the labour 
force than unmarried women, while married men earn higher wages than their unmarried 
counterparts (Ahituv and Lerman, 2007; Schoeni, 1995). In more recent years, a limited 
literature in this field has begun to grow in developing countries (Sackey, 2005; Ntuli, 2007; 
Casale and Posel, 2010). The current study aims to contribute to this literature, specifically in 
the case of Lesotho, a country for which such studies presently do not exist. 
This chapter will describe the extent to which the observations found in previous studies are 
also evident in Lesotho. Further, due to the lack of academic research that model activities of 
the labour market of Lesotho, the current study will base its analysis approach on other studies 
done mainly in the Southern African region, South Africa to be precise.  
This chapter consists of four parts. In the first section, the Integrated Labour Force Survey 
dataset used throughout the study is described. This section will also elaborate on why this 
dataset was chosen and its drawbacks. Section 3.2 elaborates on the sample construction, 
and defines key variables used in the analysis. Descriptive statistics of the labour market 
status samples, by gender and marital status are presented in Section 3.3, and Section 3.4 
concludes. 
3.1 Data description 
This study will use cross sectional data from the May 2008 Integrated Labour Force Survey 
(ILFS) which was collected by the Bureau of Statistics Lesotho. The survey gathered 
information on the composition, size and characteristics of the labour force in Lesotho, using 
interviews with 12 000 households. Through this survey the Bureau of Statistics Lesotho 
analysed the employment and labour situation in Lesotho at the time of the survey. The main 
focus of the survey was on the size and spatial distribution of the labour force, and analysing 
market related characteristics. The survey was also aimed at helping government to assess 
the participation of different groups of the population, specifically women and youth, into the 





The survey also collected information that would help in the analysis of the employability of 
individuals in Lesotho. Further, it aimed to provide an insight to policy makers and government 
on the type of job that should be created so as to reduce unemployment and 
underemployment. Its final goal was to help in understanding the informal sector and the type 
of job that are offered in that sector, while making it easier to determine its role to the economy 
(Bureau of Statistics, 2008).   
As compared to all the data available in Lesotho from government and non-governmental 
departments, the ILFS is the best choice because it is the only survey of its kind that collects 
information at household and individual level looking at labour force activities in Lesotho. 
Further, ILFS is the only analytical report which consists of data on population in the labour 
force, economic activity, population employed, earnings, employment and occupational 
characteristics, employment in secondary activities, unemployment, under employment, 
informal sector, migration, child labour, youth, non-market activities and household 
characteristics and amenities (Bureau of Statistics, 2008).  It collects extensive information for 
those that are economically active and inactive, employed and unemployed. It further deals 
with all employment sectors in the country, the formal and informal sectors (Bureau of 
Statistics, 2008).  While previous surveys of the labour force have been conducted in Lesotho, 
the ILFS 2008 is the most recently collected dataset.  
The survey contains comprehensive coverage of labour force information. There is information 
on marital status, the current employment status and earnings, amongst other individual-level 
and household-level variables. One main advantage of the survey is that it also collects 
information about employment in home production and the number of hours spent in 
housework. It is through this range of information that the study will examine the role that 
marital status plays regarding labour force participation, employment and earnings. Thus far, 
the ILFS is the best source of data that is available that can be used to carry out this study. 
Furthermore, academic research using the 2008 ILFS has not previously been published 
(Bureau of Statistics, 2008).  The sample of this survey was designed using a two-staged 
stratified sample methodology. The stratifying was done using the agro-ecological zones, 
namely lowland, foothill, and mountain and Senqu river valley. The other stratifying variables 
that were used were rural and urban areas. The two stages involved in selecting the sampling 
units involved the primary sampling unit which involved the selection of enumeration areas. 
The second stage was the selection of sampling units which are households selected 







3.2 Construction of Sample and Key Variables 
The dataset contains weights that can be used to make the sample estimates representative 
of the population. However, the later analysis in this dissertation involves estimating two levels 
of sample selection, followed by an interval regression model, the estimation of which 
becomes complex when attempting to use weights. Therefore for consistency with the later 
regression estimation, all analysis is presented at the level of the sample. 
For the purpose of the study, individuals who will potentially form part of the labour force are 
those between the ages of 15 to 65 who are not in full time education. Those who report 
themselves as working full time, part-time, those on sick-leave when the survey was 
conducted, and those that are self-employed are classified as the employed sample, provided 
that they report a positive earning. This means that subsistence farmers are not counted as 
employed unless they also perform some wage-earning work. Additionally, those who report 
themselves as unemployed but looking for work will be captured as unemployed. The final 
group will be those that are economically inactive as they are not interested in employment 
such as pensioners or are not actively searching for work. For the purpose of the study the 
narrow definition of unemployment will be used, because even the 2008 ILFS defined 
unemployment as the population that concurrently did not have jobs, but were available for 
work and seeking for working during a week preceding the survey (Bureau of Statistics, 2008).   
To examine the effects of marital status on participation, employment and earnings by using 
both descriptive and regression analysis, the key variable will be marital status. The question 
on marital status in the ILFS 2008 had seven options from which respondents can choose, 
namely: never been married, monogamously married, polygamously married, living together, 
separated, divorced and widowed.  
The table 3.1 below gives the percentage of people that are in the labour force that belong to 
each marital status category by gender. This is a broader range of categories than used in 
labour force surveys in many other countries. For example, South Africa’s Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey allows only for one category of marriage, and does not distinguish between 
those who are separated and those who are divorced (Statistics South Africa, 2013). Another 
objective of this study is to examine the labour market differences by marital status and by 
gender. Therefore, t-test were conducted on the descriptive statistics results throughout the 
chapter. The results for men are base categories and they will be compared to those of women 






Table 3.1: The sample distribution according to marital status, by gender and labour market status (%) 
 
Marital Status 
Economically inactive Unemployed-Searching Employed 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Never married 44.43 17.66*** 47.58 30.95*** 31.49 28.34*** 
Monogamously married 45.49 59.65*** 45.52 48.74* 60.69 43.27*** 
Polygamously married 0.61 0.78 0.66 0.48 0.87 0.59 
Cohabiting 0.19 0.15 0.33 0.27 0.19 0.34 
Separated 3.69 2.84** 2.85 4.02* 2.71 6.42*** 
Divorced 0.57 0.76 0.27 2.11*** 0.58 1.69*** 
Widowed 5.02 18.16*** 2.79 13.43*** 3.47 19.35*** 
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number of observations 4720 6580 1507 1467 5389 3846 
Source:  ILFS (2008). 
Notes: The samples include all males and females aged 15-65 years. ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates for 
women differs from that for men at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 significance levels respectively.  
 
Looking at table 3.1 above, the overall distribution of the sample is mainly dominated by those 
never married and in monogamous marriages regardless of their labour market status. The 
largest representation for men are 60.69 percent of employed men who are monogamously 
married. This is followed by 59.65 percent of economically inactive women who are 
monogamously married. Amongst the economically inactive, women are much less likely than 
men, 17.66 percent compared to 44.43 percent, to be never married, and are much more likely 
than men to be monogamously married. Similar patterns exist amongst the unemployed, 
although the gender differences are smaller. In contrast, amongst the employed, a greater 
percentage of men than women, 60.69 percent compared to 43.27 percent, are 
monogamously married. Thus women’s employment is strongly negatively associated with 
monogamous marriage. In addition, although the categories are very small, a significantly 
larger percentage of economically active women than men are separated or divorced, 
suggesting that separation from a partner may drive women into the labour market. Across all 
categories, women are much more likely than men to be widowed, which suggests that even 
in the 18 to 65 age group, husbands tend to die before their wives. The table shows that the 
sample size for other marital statues namely cohabiting, divorced and polygamous marriages 
are small and below 1 percent for the different labour market classifications. This substantial 
differences in the distribution of marital status by gender and labour market status provides 
part of the motivation for this study. However, the survey contains only this one question which 
relates to marital status, namely the person’s current marital status. Further information is not 
collected. For instance, the duration of one’s current marital status may affect participation, 
employment or earnings, but such information is not available.  
Following on the literature review conducted in Chapter 2, other variables which will be 





and earnings will include household characteristics. The household characteristics will include 
the number of children in the household, the number of the elderly in the household, the 
presence of a spouse in household and other employed household members, and other 
household income from employment. Other household income is constructed as the sum of 
the earnings of other household members, using the midpoints of the reported earnings 
categories as broad income proxies. The survey did not collect information on the value of 
other income sources, such as pensions and remittances. This variable will therefore be 
treated with caution. Other inclusions will be the typical labour market covariates such as age, 
location, education, occupation and hours worked.  
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents descriptive statistics of the variables that will be estimated in the study.  
Tables 3.2 - 3.5 present the results of a segmented labour market analysis looking at different 
covariates such as years of schooling, age, location, number of children under the age of 
seven and those between eight to fourteen, number of adults in the household over seventy, 
the presence of other employed household member, other household income from 
employment, and involvement in household work (a dummy variable indicating whether or not 
the individual performs household chores).  
The data were segmented in this manner so that comparisons of the different groups in the 
labour force (the economically inactive, unemployed and employed) can be made. The sample 
is further divided by gender and marital status (never married, monogamously married, 
polygamously married, cohabiting, separated, divorced and widowed). 
Table 3.2 below presents descriptive statistics for the covariates mentioned above for the 
economically inactive population. When looking at those economically inactive across all the 
different marital statuses, the age covariates reveal that the youngest group is represented by 
never married men and women aged on average 23.56 and 23.79 years respectively. The 
oldest groups are represented by men in polygamous marriages, men and women who are 







































































0.16 0.05*** 0.30 0.04*** 0.57 0.04 0.11 0.30 0.35 0.04*** 0.41 0.06*** 0.41 0.09*** 







0.57 0.68*** 0.36 0.66*** 0.89 0.60 0.51 0.72*** 0.44 0.8*** 0.51 0.79*** 







0.12 0.28*** 0.04 0.30*** 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.23** 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.12* 







0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (.) (.) (.) (.) (0.01) (0.04) (.) (.) (0.00) 




0.09 0.12*** 0.11 0.14 0.22 0.30 0.06 0.11* 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.12** 







1.02 1.06 0.93 1.10 0.56 0.50 0.28 1.11*** 0.15 1.12*** 0.49 0.77*** 







0.92 0.94 0.86 1.12 0.33 0.20 0.42 1.02*** 0.56 1.12*** 0.60 0.94*** 








0.53 0.80*** 0.71 1.10 0.11 0.40 0.35 0.64 0.11 0.08*** 0.37 0.50** 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.28) (0.18) (0.11) (0.16) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.05) (0.02) 






0.09 0.10*** 0.07 0.18** 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.16 0.0*** 










644.64 2454.00** 44.44 515.00 359.65 1193.17** 200.00 927.00** 309.07 559.63*
** 



















0.65 0.82*** 0.70 0.78 0.66 0.84*** 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) 
No. of 
observations 
2046 1127 2094 3835 28 50 9 10 171 183 27 50 237 1168 
Source:  ILFS (2008). 





The education covariates indicate the proportion of individuals in each education category, 
and show that on average, most people who are economically inactive have primary 
education. This finding is observed for both men and women in the different marital status. For 
instance, 89 percent of economically inactive men who are cohabiting have primary education 
and 79 percent for widowed women. With the except of primary education estimates for 
cohabiting women which shows an insignificant gender difference, the other marital categories 
estimates indicate a 0.01 significance level in gender difference. The covariate for secondary 
education shows that on average there are more women who are economically inactive with 
secondary education than there are men, for all the marital status categories. Further, the 
sample also shows that on average there are very few people with tertiary education that are 
economically inactive, suggesting that tertiary education induces individuals to either search 
for or find work because the labour market favours those who are educated in terms of 
opportunities available and earnings. This is supported by t-test results which reveal that the 
estimates for tertiary education in all the marital categories are not significant in explaining 
gender difference. One surprising finding is that very few individuals in the sample of those 
economically inactive have no formal education, with two exceptions: men who are 
polygamously married or widowed. These sub-samples are also on average relatively old, 
suggesting a possible lack of access to formal education in the past. A possibility is that, back 
in the day in Lesotho, the practice of boys herding animals was a common practice which 
might have hindered school attendance.  
Turning to the geographical distribution of the economically inactive, when comparing men 
and women across the different marital statuses there are on average slightly more women 
living in urban areas that are economically inactive than men, though the margin is minimal. 
Overall there are very few men and women living in urban areas who are economically 
inactive.  
The next set of variables examine the household composition of the sample of the 
economically inactive. Cohabiting, separated, divorced and widowed men on average have a 
lower number of children under the ages of seven living in the household than the married 
categories. For cohabiting couples one would expect this because they may not have children 
if there is not much commitment in the formation of such families. In the case of widowed men, 
often after a man loses his wife, his mother of other female family members share the 
responsibility of taking care of the children. In the case of women, they are responsible for 
taking care of the children hence the observed large presence of children below seven. 
Similarly, there is a much larger number of children in households where a woman is 
separated or divorced than for men. Monogamously and polygamously married men and 





married individuals also live with a large number of young children. However, since these 
individuals are on average the youngest group, such children may be their siblings or other 
family members, rather than their own biological children. When looking at the presence of 
children in the school going years of eight to fourteen for the economically inactive, we see 
similar trends to the presence of children under the age of seven.   
Table 3.2 also shows that majority of economically inactive men and women in the various 
marital classifications have other employed members in their households which might induce 
them to not seek for employment. Unsurprisingly, the largest is amongst the polygamously 
married at 1.1 for women and 0.71 for men, where the household is likely to be comprised of 
a large number of adults. The other large presence of employed adults is observed for 
monogamously married women where they have 0.8 employed adults in their households. 
These findings are supported by those of other household income. Polygamously and 
monogamously married women have the highest other income in their household of R2454.00 
and R1427.24 respectively. This is not surprising, as they also have the largest number of 
employed individuals living in their households. Furthermore, the economically inactive do not 
have much presence members in their households of adults above the age of 65 for both men 
and women in all marital categories.  
Finally, the covariate of involvement in household production for the economically inactive 
shows that on average more women than men are engaged in household work. Such work 
includes fetching water or firewood, cooking food for home consumption, and caring for 
children the sick or the elderly. This finding is thus to be expected, since theory and empirical 
studies show that women more than men are engaged in household production. Fewer 
married men are engaged in household production when compared to men in other marital 
categories.   
The discussion now turns to descriptive statistics for those who are unemployed. Table 3.3 
represents the mean of the covariates for those who are unemployed. The covariates include 
household and individual characteristics that could possible influence one’s decision to search 
for employment. Similar to the previous table, both men and women who have never been 
married are the youngest, at an average age of 24.27 to 24.37 for unemployed individuals. 























































45.75 36.52 32.27** 40.50 35.90 45.73 44.89 
(6.05) (1.46) (1.33) (6.69) (1.68) (1.68) (0.76) 
No Form 
Edu 
0.09 0.01*** 0.16 0.02*** 0.44 0.00** 0.60 0.25 0.13 0.05 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.05*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.18) (.) (0.24) (0.25) (0.05) (0.03) (0.25) (.) (0.07) (0.02) 
Primary 
education 
0.58 0.42*** 0.57 0.60 0.44 0.57 0.20 0.50 0.70 0.63 0.50 0.77 0.60 0.74 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.29) (0.07) (0.07) (0.29) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) 
Secondary 
education 
0.32 0.53*** 0.26 0.37*** 0.00 0.43* 0.20 0.25 0.15 0.30* 0.25 0.23 0.13 0.21 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (.) (0.20) (0.20) (0.25) (0.06) (0.06) (0.25) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) 
Tertiary 
education 
0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (.) (.) (.) (0.03) (0.02) (.) (.) (0.03) (0.01) 
Urban area 0.22 0.31*** 0.26 0.30* 0.11 0.29 0.60 0.75 0.17 0.27 0.00 0.23*** 0.23 0.23 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.18) (0.24) (0.25) (0.06) (0.06) (.) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) 
No. of children 
under 7 
0.56 0.86*** 0.98 0.98 0.89 1.14 0.20 0.25 0.33 0.96*** 0.50 0.90 0.38 0.61* 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.26) (0.26) (0.20) (0.25) (0.09) (0.15) (0.29) (0.15) (0.12) (0.06) 
No. of children 
8-14 
0.81 0.72* 0.75 0.82 0.78 0.86 0.20 0.00 0.55 0.80 0.00 1.17*** 0.60 0.87* 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.36) (0.34) (0.20) (.) (0.12) (0.12) (.) (0.25) (0.12) (0.07) 
No. employed 
adults 
0.65 0.80** 0.53 0.77*** 0.33 0.43 0.60 0.25 0.50 0.68 0.25 0.63*** 0.40 0.36 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.24) (0.30) (0.24) (0.25) (0.11) (0.14) (0.25) (0.18) (0.13) (0.05) 
No. adults 
above 65 
0.13 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.29 0.20 0.00 0.25 0.23 0.00 0.17** 0.10 0.04** 




































0.47 0.70*** 0.41 0.87*** 0.56 0.71 0.60 0.75 0.53 0.82*** 0.75 0.60 0.67 0.86*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.18) (0.18) (0.24) (0.25) (0.08) (0.05) (0.25) (0.09) (0.08) (0.02) 
No. of obs 689 436 662 694 9 7 5 4 40 56 4 30 40 195 
Source:  ILFS (2008). 





The education covariates reveal that when women are compared to men, there are fewer 
women with no education that are searching for work. For example, 60 percent of cohabiting 
men who are unemployed are without education, compared to 25 percent of women in the 
same marital category. Turning to those with primary and secondary education, there are on 
average more people who have primary education than with secondary education amongst 
those who are unemployed. The table shows that, across all marital status categories, 
unemployed women are more likely than unemployed men to have either primary or secondary 
education. This suggests that the factors that determine labour market access may differ 
substantially by gender. There are very few people in the sample that are unemployed when 
they have a tertiary education.  
The geographical distribution shows that on average there are fewer men and women who 
are unemployed that live in urban areas, although substantially more than was the case for 
the economically inactive. The exception is with cohabiting, where 60 and 75 percent of men 
and women respectively who are unemployed live in urban areas. 
On average women have more children under the age of 7 living in the household than men 
across all the marital categories. For instance, 96 percent of separated women have children 
under the age of 7 as compared to only 33 percent of men. The presence of children in the 
school-going age for the unemployed sample shows similar patterns to the presence of 
children less than 7 years. However, the gender difference in the presence of children in the 
school going years is smaller than that for younger children. 
Table 3.3 further shows variation in the average number of other employed members in the 
household. Never married and monogamously married women have the highest presence of 
working adults in their household at 0.80 and 0.77 respectively. This is seen when looking at 
other household income, where still never married and monogamously married women have 
the highest other income when compared to men and women in other marital categories. 
When comparing men and women, results (see asterisks in table 3.3) show that the gender 
difference are mainly not significant. The only estimates of women that differ from that of men 
are those in monogamous marriages and never married at 0.01 significance level. The 
unemployed and searching men and women reported that not many of them had adults above 
the age of 65 in their household. On average more women than men are engaged in 
household work across most of the marital status categories. A much smaller proportion of 
both gender perform household work than was the case for the economically inactive, perhaps 





The following section will discuss the description of results for employed men and women. 
Table 3.4 presents the results for the sub-sample of employed men and women. This table is 








































Age 24.18 26.94*** 38.43 35.78*** 47.22 38.76*** 44.22 42.92 37.41 37.95 40.07 39.31 46.30 45.32 
 (0.17) (0.26) (0.18) (0.26) (1.57) (2.60) (3.25) (3.17) (0.87) (0.68) (1.96) (1.24) (0.76) (0.38) 
No Formal 
Education 
0.14 0.02*** 0.14 0.01*** 0.28 0.05** 0.44 0.00** 0.21 0.01*** 0.10 0.02 0.21 0.04*** 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.08) (0.05) (0.18) (.) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
Primary 0.57 0.41*** 0.50 0.46*** 0.61 0.57 0.33 0.58 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.55 0.60 
Education (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.11) (0.17) (0.15) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) 
Secondary 0.25 0.48*** 0.29 0.41*** 0.08 0.29* 0.22 0.42 0.29 0.46*** 0.28 0.40 0.21 0.29** 
Education (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) 
Tertiary 0.04 0.09*** 0.07 0.12*** 0.03 0.10* 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.15 0.03 0.07*** 
Education (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (.) (.) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) 
Urban 0.24 0.47*** 0.34 0.49*** 0.31 0.57* 0.78 1.00 0.29 0.35*** 0.45 0.56 0.30 0.39** 
Area (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.11) (0.15) (.) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) 
No. children 0.54 0.63*** 0.88 0.72*** 0.97 0.76 0.22 0.25 0.32 0.68*** 0.28 0.61** 0.52 0.61 
under 7 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.18) (0.15) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.03) 
No. children 0.79 0.68*** 0.82 0.73*** 1.06 0.90 0.00 0.17 0.48 0.90*** 0.59 0.89 0.70 0.82* 
8-14 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.18) (0.19) (.) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.03) 
No. employed 
adults 
1.13 0.92*** 0.69 1.01*** 0.89 1.57* 0.70 0.58 0.71 0.67 0.86 0.63 0.47 0.52 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.20) (0.32) (0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.07) (0.20) (0.13) (0.06) (0.03) 
No. adults 0.18 0.14*** 0.07 0.08** 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.06** 
above 65 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.07) (.) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) 
Other 
household 
2301.09 2659.92** 3396.84 3772.48* 3580.56 2930.95 1116.67 791.67 2168.35 1641.00 2124.14 1646.77 2636.52 1871.74 
Income (96.74) (132.89) (98.37) (98.37) (997.27) (716.74) (354.04) (167.86) (317.78) (143.57) (410.88) (307.07) (445.75) (154.87) 
Household 0.34 0.56*** 0.26 0.71*** 0.42 0.71** 0.22 0.92*** 0.46 0.61*** 0.52 0.56 0.39 0.62*** 
production (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.10) (0.15) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) 
No. 
observations 
1612 1013 3114 1606 36 21 9 12 139 239 29 62 178 713 
Source:  ILFS (2008). 








The age covariates reveal that on average the youngest group is still men and women who 
are never married just as the results in table 3.2 and 3.3 indicated. The oldest employed marital 
group are those in polygamous marriages averaging 47.22 years. Education is among 
determinants that make individuals favourable to employers than those without education. 
Therefore, the observed results where few employed people are without education was 
expected. Even though results show that few employed individuals have no formal education, 
it is interesting that there is a difference in magnitude between men and women. Across all 
marital status 0-5 percent of women have no formal education compared to men who average 
14-44 percent.  Men across the different marital categories who are employed are typically 
more likely to have primary education than secondary and tertiary education. Similar results 
are observed for women, though the difference between these two categories is typically 
smaller than for men. The results surprisingly show that women who are employed are more 
likely to have more education than men. This is observed across all marital categories. This 
may suggest that there exist discrimination in Lesotho’s labour market against women, in that 
for women to be employable, they need to have more education than men. It may also indicate 
that women are more likely than men to be employed in occupations such as teaching and 
nursing, which require advanced qualifications. 
Overall, the location distribution show that there are more women than men employed that are 
living in urban areas. For example, 49 percent of monogamously married compared to 34 
percent of men live in urban areas, and this relationship is observed for all the marital 
classifications. Again one explanation for this maybe be that of the majority of women in 
Lesotho being employed in the textile and garment sectors, where majority of the factories are 
found in large urban towns.   
Not surprisingly, employed married men and women have more children under 7 years in their 
households than other marital status categories. The gender differences in the number of 
young children are smaller than for the other labour market statuses, and in some cases favour 
men, suggesting that the presence of young children is a constraint on women’s employment. 
Employed men and women in the seven different marital statuses all have the presence of 
children between schools going years of 8 to 14 in their households. The t-test results for the 
two coefficients indicate that gender differences are significant at 0.01 level for never married, 
monogamously married and separated women. 
Table 3.4 further shows that most households by gender and marital status of the employed 
reported to have other employed adults in their households (the variable here indicates 





women across all the marital statuses reported having very few adults over the age of 65 in 
their households.  
On average more employed women than men are involved in household production, which is 
in line with what theory predicts. Most women perform household tasks such as fetching water 
or firewood, or caring for others, despite being employed, but only a minority of employed men 
are engaged in such tasks. 56 percent of women who have never married are engaged in 
household work, compared to 71 percent of monogamously married women.  
Monogamously married women on average reported more other household income (at 
R3 772.48, excluding their own earnings) than other marital status groups. This is an 
interesting finding which supports findings from chapter two. It confirms that indeed the labour 
market favours married men because chances are the high income observed for married 
women is due to their husbands earnings. The other household income estimates for 
monogamously married women differ from that for men at 0.1 significance level. Cohabiting 
individuals reported the lowest other income in their household from employment for both men 
and women and the gender difference is not significant for this marital category. 
Another expected finding in line with what theory predicted in chapter 2 is high women’s 
involvement in household production than men. However, one would have expected to see 
lower figures because when they are employed it means they now spend more time at work 
than at home. This might also suggest that women are working in less demanding and low 
paying jobs which allow their engagement in household work.  
Table 3.5 below, shows occupational and productivity characteristics for the employed sample 
in the study, which are expected to be some of the characteristics that determine earnings. 
Before presenting the results, it should be noted that some people may have not indicated 
their occupations. The question around occupation might also be a sensitive question as it 
can somewhat give an indication of the earnings of the individual in question.  
 Never married males and females on average supplied more hours per week 953.68 and 
53.66 respectively) than individuals in other marital status categories.  It is surprising that 
employed females in polygamous marriages work on average similar hours (52.48) to never 
married women. This could mean that, when some women in polygamous marriages work, 
other wives take care of the household, which gives allowance for those who are employed to 
work more hours. However, these estimates must be treated with caution as they are derived 
from a small sample. With regards to males, married men work fewer hours than never married 
and separated men. It was expected that married men would be working on average longer 





production, their partners will be engaged more in the labour market (Waldfogel, 1997; Bardasi 








































Hours 53.69 53.66 50.58 46.68*** 47.97 52.48 54.00 44.38 50.01 47.77 48.28 51.25 48.72 46.82 
Worked (0.40) (0.57) (0.30) (0.45) (2.28) (3.97) (8.42) (5.04) (1.66) (1.20) (3.91) (2.94) (1.31) (0.76) 
Officials 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (.) (.) (.) (0.01) (0.01) (.) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Professionals 0.01 0.03*** 0.02 0.04*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02** 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (.) (0.00) 
Technicians 0.03 0.07*** 0.05 0.13*** 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.10*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (.) (.) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Clerks 0.04 0.09*** 0.03 0.08*** 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.08** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (.) (0.06) (.) (.) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.08*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.13) (.) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Trade 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (0.00) (.) (.) (0.01) (0.00) 
Craft 0.11 0.06 0.25 0.08*** 0.37 0.13** 0.00 0.31** 0.17 0.09** 0.26 0.07** 0.26 0.10*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.07) (.) (0.13) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Machine 0.05 0.13*** 0.13 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (.) (0.10) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
Elementary 0.54 0.51* 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.60 0.62 0.48 0.52 0.26 0.48* 0.42 0.47* 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) (0.14) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) 
Armed forces 0.01 0.00** 0.01 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (0.03) (.) (0.01) (.) 
No. 
observations 
1584 1027 3097 1594 38 23 9 13 142 232 29 61 174 724 
Source:  ILFS (2008). 







In terms of the occupational characteristics, employed men and women are highly 
concentrated in elementary occupations across all marital classifications. There is not much 
difference in the average means of men and women employed in high skill occupations. For 
instance, 48 and 52 percent of separated men and women are employed in elementary 
occupations compared to 1 percent of separated men and women employed in official 
occupations or 6 and 8 percent in professional jobs. Other marital categories show that craft 
occupations are generally occupied by men, while machinery occupations (which are typically 
located in the garment and textile industry) are more common amongst women.  
When comparing results for men and women by marital status in table 3.5, results show that 
gender difference are mainly observed for professional, technical and clerical occupations. 
The estimates of this variables are significantly different at 0.01 level for women never married, 
monogamously married and widowed from that men in the same marital categories. 
The following section presents the earning data that will be used in this study which were given 
as monthly earnings expressed in 2008 prices. The currency of Lesotho is the Maloti, which 
is pegged at a one-to-one basis to the South African Rand. Due to the sensitivity surrounding 
the disclosure of wages, wages were reported as categories. Self-employed individuals and 
business owners reported their profits in the same categories, although for the sake of brevity 
all income from employment is referred to here as wages or earnings. Tables 3.6 show these 




















































1- 299 26.48 17.76*** 5.78 13.32 2.63 17.65 25.00 41.67 16.15 21.33 8.33 12.73 12.88  22.07 
300-499 20.20 19.25 6.25 14.32 7.89 5.88 0.00 16.67 16.92 13.33 12.50 7.27 14.11  16.15 
500-999 24.81 39.68 22.83 39.81 7.89 47.06 50.00 33.33 36.15 42.67 29.17 50.91 17.18  35.41  
1000-1999 15.73 13.00* 26.53 14.79 28.95 0.00*** 12.50 8.33 18.46 12.00** 16.67 16.36 20.25  13.93***  
2000-4999 10.29 7.44*** 30.40 11.50*** 44.74 23.53* 12.50 0.00 9.23 8.00 29.17 7.27*** 28.83  10.07*** 
5000-9999 2.12 2.48 5.72 4.71* 5.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.54 1.78 4.17 3.64 4.91 1.63***  
10000-
19999 
0.23 0.30 1.61 1.14 0.00 5.88 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.89 0.00 1.82 0.00 0.44 
20000-
49999 
0.15 0.10 0.57 0.40 2.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.15 
50000+ 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.84  0.15*** 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
No. of 
observations 
1322 1008 2974 1487 38 17 8 12 130 225 24 55 163 675 





A glance at table 3.6 shows that wage distribution is sparsely represented by the sample 
mainly the wage categories R10 000 to R50 000+. We see that in this wage categories, it is 
men who are represented more than women. For instance, 0.57 and 2.63 percent of married 
men and 0.77 percent of separated men earn wages between R20 000- R49 999. This could 
suggest that high paying jobs might be reserved more for men.  Lower wage categories are 
represented by a larger percentage of men and women in their respective marital statuses. 
However, men still dominate more than women. The wage category of R1-299 show that 17.65 
percent of polygamously married women are in this wage category compared to 8.33 percent 
in men in the same marital category. However, still looking at the same marital category for 
higher wage category (R1 000-1 999) 28.95 percent of men fall in that category and no women 
earn that amount. This again is expected given that the highest employer in Lesotho is the 
textile and garment sector which offers salaries ranging from R800 to R1 000. For men, it is 
at low wage categories (R1-299 and R300-499) where there are more never married. As the 
wage distribution increase we see that married (monogamous or polygamous) men are 
represented more. This could then suggest that like theory predicted, marriage leads to 
increased wages for men and labour market favours married men more. For women, results 
are not as theory has previously suggested. In Lesotho, married women are represented more 
in higher wage categories than unmarried women. This could suggest that married women are 
likely to earn more than their unmarried counterparts. 
When looking at t-test results for table 3.6, at a glance most of the estimates reveal that gender 
differences are not significant. For example, there are no significant gender differences in all 
the earnings categories between men and women who are cohabiting. The same applies for 
the wage category R300-499 where all marital categories the gender differences are 
insignificant. Part of the reason for the lack of significant differences may be that some of the 
sample sizes are very small. The regression analysis in Chapter 4 will allow for these 
differences to be examined in a multivariate context without needing to split the sample by 
marital status. 
A limitation of the study is thus its collection of earnings data, in that it does not report exact 
hourly/monthly earnings for each individual but rather it categorises the earnings. This problem 
will be overcome in the estimation of the earnings regression equations in Chapter 4 through 
the use of interval regression methods. The method itself will be explained further in the next 
chapter.  
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter began by discussing data that will be used in the study. The study will use 





of Statistics Lesotho. The data were gathered from 12 000 households across Lesotho and 
the survey’s main aim was to look at the size, spatial the distribution of the labour force, and 
analysing market related characteristics. The chapter further explained that the sample which 
will be used throughout the study will consist of individuals between ages 15 to 65, categorised 
into seven different marital status groups.  
The majority of the sample is dominated by men and women who have either never married 
or are monogamously married, as they are marital categories represented by large numbers 
regardless of their labour market status. Women’s employment is strongly negatively 
associated with monogamous marriage, and there are some descriptive suggestions that the 
lack of a partner may drive women into the labour market. 
Most of the chapter presented and discussed descriptive statistics for three sub-samples, 
namely the economically inactive, unemployed (defined as those actively searching for work), 
and employed. Across all labour market statuses, the youngest group were men and women 
who have never been married. The oldest groups for the inactive sample were widowed men 
and women, whereas for the unemployed and employed it was men in polygamous marriages. 
Additionally, educational characteristics for the inactive population showed that those who are 
inactive are on average more likely to have primary education than no education. This was an 
interesting finding as the opposite was expected. Overall, the education results suggest that 
the factors that determine labour market access may differ substantially by gender. This was 
supported by the findings, where men with no formal education search for work and for women 
it was though with primary education. The geographical distribution revealed that the sub-
sample that was found most in the urban areas were the employed. These results suggest 
that in Lesotho living in an urban area is likely to guarantee an individual employed. 
Additionally, there are more women than men live in urban area. Household characteristics 
revealed that most households have children below the age seven and in school going years. 
When comparing the three sub-samples, it was found that the average number of children 
under the age of 7 in the household for employed men and women is smaller than for the 
unemployed or inactive, across all the marital categories. Men and women in cohabiting 
relationships had the least presence of children, while monogamously and polygamous 
married men and women had on average the largest presence of children in their households 
Furthermore, it was found that, there are very few adults above the age of 65 in all households 
across the different marital status indicators. The least number was found for the employed 
and this could be that they are engaged in labour market activities and they cannot take care 
of the elderly. The results for household production were like those discussed in chapter two, 





The chapter also looked at the distribution of earnings across gender and marital status. The 
distribution of earnings revealed that men are represented more than women in high paying 
earnings (R10 000 – 50 000+), which could suggest that high paying jobs might be reserved 
more for men. For men, it is at low wage categories (R1-299 and R300-499) where there are 
more never married. As the wage distribution increase we see that married men are 
represented more. This could then suggest that like theory predicted, marriage leads to 
increased wages for men and labour market favours married men more. For women, married 
women are represented more in wage categories than unmarried women suggesting that 
married women are likely to earn more than their unmarried counterparts. 
One of the objectives of this study is to examine the labour market differences by marital status 
and by gender. Therefore, t-test were conducted on the descriptive statistics results 
throughout the chapter. The results for men are base categories and they were compared to 
those of women to see if the estimates are significantly different from each other. Across the 
chapter, it was observed that most of gender difference existed mainly for men and women in 
monogamous marriage, never been married and widowed. There is could be concluded that 
means estimated are different by for men and women by marital group. The next chapter will 
try and explain the role of marital status in the labour market of Lesotho in a multivariate 
context. Moreover, it describes the methodology and the econometric models that will be used 
for the analysis. The various covariates discussed in this chapter will be combined in the next 
chapter so as to identify their importance in the presence of other variables, in the econometric 
models. These models will be used to determine the significance of marital status and other 
factors in explaining the stages of the labour market process, namely, labour force 















Chapter four: Methodology and model estimation 
The previous chapter provided a detailed description of the data being used in this study which 
comes from Lesotho’s Integrated Labour Force Survey. The chapter examined marital status 
by gender, the sample distribution by individual characteristics, and the distribution of earnings 
by gender and marital status. Educational results highlighted that the maybe other factors that 
determine labour market access which may differ substantially by gender. It can also be 
argued that those in polygamous marriages are economically and financially in a better 
position that other marital categories. They had the highest number of employed members 
(other than themselves) in their houses and more other income in the household. Further, as 
theory has predicted, on average married women have more child than any other marital 
category. The distributing of earnings, showed that men tend to be in higher earning 
distribution than women. Also, results supported those predicted by theory that married men 
tend are likely to earn more than unmarried men. This was seen where, in low wage categories 
it was unmarried men that dominated. While, for women it was found that married women earn 
more than their unmarried counterparts. 
However, the drawback of interpreting descriptive statistics is that it is not possible to control 
for other observed differences between individuals. The next step in the analysis will therefore 
be to estimate the role of marital status in a multivariate context. These econometric models 
will determine the importance of the covariates in explaining the different stages of labour 
force process, namely labour force participation, employment and earnings. The modelling 
work that will be done in this chapter will be formulated using the analysis from the previous 
chapter.  
This chapter will consist of three sections. The first section will give a detailed explanation on 
how the models to be in will be set out and the methodology used. The second part will 
estimate the models and discuss the results. Lastly, part 3 will conclude.  
4.1 Econometric methodology 
Three stages of estimation will be used in this study and they will be dealt with sequentially. 
The three stages are labour force participation, employment and earnings. The methodology 
used follows that of Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001) for South Africa, but has not previously been 
applied to Lesotho. The three stages are described below.  
The first stage involves estimating a probit model for labour force participation for a full sample 
of individuals who are likely to participate in the labour market, that is, those aged 15 to 65 
who are not in school full-time. The probit model for labour force participation will estimate the 





determine how individuals are selected into the labour force. The model will be estimated 
separately by gender. In particular, the model will examine how labour force participation 
differs across marital status, in light of the literature explored in Chapter Two which suggested 
that participation is less (more) likely amongst married women (men) than unmarried women 
(men).  
The labour force participation equation is given by: 
LFPi = α1Mi + α2Xi + εi       (1) 
Where LFPi is the binary choice variable showing if individual i participates in the labour force. 
The dependent variable LFP will take the values 0 and 1, where 1 represents those who 
participate and 0 represents non-participation. The independent variables (Xi) will include 
factors such as age, education characteristics, household characteristics such as income from 
other employed members (the square of this variable will be included so as to allow for non-
linearity), household production, household composition (the number of adult household 
member above the age of 65, the number so children below the age of 7, and the number of 
children between ages 8-14) and location. The variables of interest, Mi, represent the group 
of dummy variables representing one’s marital status. εi is the error term. The equation will be 
estimated by a probit model to determine factors that determine one’s decision to participate 
in the labour force. The second step is to estimate another probit model from the reduced 
sample of those who participate in the labour force, which will look at the probability of being 
employed. This distinction between participation and employment is important because of high 
unemployment rates in Lesotho, where there are large number of people willing to enter the 
labour force but unable to find employment (ILFS, 2008). Again, the variable of interest will be 
marital status. The question that this estimation will seek to answer is whether men and 
women with different marital statuses experience different outcomes when searching for work. 
If so, their marital status may say something about their motivation during job search, or their 
attractiveness to potential employers.  
The employment equation will be given by;  
Ei = β1Mi + β2Zi + μi       (2) 
The dependent variable Ei will take the values 0 and 1, where 1 represents those who are 
employed and 0 otherwise. The independent variables (Zi) will include personal characteristics 
such as age, education, location, engagement in household production. Again, Mi represents 





The last model will be an earnings equation using the sample of those who find employment. 
This will highlight the factors that determine the earnings of the employed. For the purpose of 
the study, the earnings equation will be estimated using the log-linear interval regression 
method because in the ILFS 2008 earnings responses were captured as intervals. Here, the 
key question is whether earnings differ by marital status. If so, this is likely to reflect the 
explanations discussed in Chapter 2, such as specialisation within the household or selection 
into marriage. 
The earnings equation will be given as: 
lnWi = б1Mi + б2Gi + Чi        (3) 
The dependent variable will be the log of monthly wages (lnwi) and the independent variables 
(Gi) will be the different occupational categories, the sector of employment, education, 
potential experience, location, and hours worked. Again, Mi represents the group of dummy 
variables representing one’s marital status and Чi is the error term.  
The separation of the equations into labour force participation, employment and earnings will 
help in understanding how different variables affect each labour market outcome. This is 
because not the same set of variables affects each equation. The labour market participation 
equation is usually affected to a large extent by household characteristics such as the number 
of children and other household income (Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 2001). The employment 
equation on the other hand depends on the personal characteristics of the individual looking 
for a job such as their education and location. The earnings equation also includes many of 
these characteristics from the employment selection equation. However, the effects of the 
variables are not necessarily the same. For instance, age can be used to calculate an 
approximate value for experience in the earnings equation, whereas in the determination of 
employment, age itself is likely to be more important than the amount of experience. Though, 
having some experience may still matter. Further, wage determination depends on the 
characteristics of the job that one has and the hours dedicated to the job (Bhorat and 
Leibbrandt, 2001). 
In general, there are potential concerns that the results from earnings equations need to be 
interpreted with caution as there might be presence of measurement error due to the way in 
which wages are measured, which might lead to biased estimates (Keane, 2011). This 
problem is partly overcome in the ILFS through the use of bracketed-response options on 
earnings. Although the fact that actual earnings values are not reported presents a 
disadvantage for some forms of analysis, respondents are less likely to report their earnings 





4.1.1 Heckman Selection Approach 
A potential concern is that the employment and earnings equations may yield biased estimates 
if they are estimated from sub-samples selected on a non-random basis. If unmeasured 
variables affect both the outcome of interest and the probability of being in the sample, then 
estimations may suffer from sample selection bias. To control for the presence of sample 
selection into participation and employment, the Heckman selection approach will be used 
(Heckman, 1979). 
The Heckman selection method is based on a two part model, where one part is the selection 
equation and the other is the outcome equation. By accounting for selection of the sample, it 
aims to produce unbiased estimates of coefficients in the outcome equation. The selection 
equation contains a binary outcome reflecting whether or not an observation is part of the 
sample, which is estimated using the probit model (Sackey, 2005).  
In this study, the sample selection problem may arise when individuals decide not to work in 
the labour market and rather participate in home production, or if people choose to participate 
but cannot find work. If the choice between labour market activities and home production, or 
ability to find work, is not random, in unmeasured ways that are correlated with employment 
or earnings respectively, then one would observe inconsistent ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates. However, the Heckman selection model solves this problem by treating the 
unobserved or unmeasured variables as omitted (Dolton and Makepeace, 1986).  
The study will have two levels of selection: into labour force participation, and employment. It 
will therefore follow the method of Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001) to control for selection. Firstly, 
the probit model for labour force participation will be estimated and from that estimation the 
inverse mills ratio (λ1) (also known as Heckman’s Lambda) will be derived which will then be 
included in the employment probit model.  
The employment equation will now be given as 
Ei = β1Mi + β2Zi + λ1 + μi       (4) 
The inclusion of λ1will permit the probit model for employment to be estimated conditional on 
positive participation. Following Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001), household size and 
composition variables act as exclusion restrictions in this estimation. The Heckman estimate 
of equation (4) will consist of two parts. The first part will be a binary selection equation, the 
probability of observing LFPi =1 or LFPi =0. The second part describes the probability of 
employment for those with positive participation. The employment probit model will then be 





probability of earnings being observed given the independent variables, an after controlling for 
selection into participation. The new inverse mills ratio will reflect an individual’s selection into 
employment, and thus into the earnings equation.  
The second inverse mills ratio (λ2) will be included in the earnings equation, which will show 
earnings that are conditional on labour force participation and selection into employment 
(Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 2001). The new earnings equation will be given as 
lnWi = б1Mi + б2Gi + λ2 + Чi        (5) 
Suitable exclusion restrictions, as available in the ILFS 2008, will be identified for each level 
of selection. Similar to Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001), age acts as an exclusion restriction in 
this model. For the regression, the earnings equation will be estimated using interval 
regression rather than OLS, to deal with the earnings data having been collected in intervals 
without exact values. The results of interval regression estimation are interpreted in the same 
way as OLS results.  
The results of equation 2 and 4 will be compared, and the same will be done for equations 3 
and 5. 
The two equations (equations 4 and 5) will contain a set of dummy variables (Mi) for the marital 
status categories used in the study and Gi and Zi are vectors of control variables. This will be 
main variable of interest, to see how marital status impacts employment and earnings when 
correcting for selection. Further, each model will be estimated separately by gender because 
there are expected to be different determination processes for men and women. 
It should also be noted that the models will be estimated with and without correcting for 
selection. If there is no correlation between the error terms of the selection and outcome 
equations, then the selection equation is unnecessary and a simple outcome model can be 
used (Verbeek, 2012). However, even in the presence of a significant selection bias, if the 
exclusion restrictions used to identify the selection equation are not appropriate, then the 
results may not be robust. It must be acknowledged that it is difficult to justify the choice of 
exclusion variables used in the main equations for the employment and earning equations. 
This is because the dataset is very limited in terms of the availability of exclusion restrictions, 
and therefore the study has chosen to use the same variables as Bhorat and Leibbrandt for 
comparability purposes. Nonetheless, if these variables have an independent effect on the 
outcome of interest, then the selection model estimates may be biased.  Therefore, the models 





two methods, as well as conducting hypothesis tests on the significance of the sample 
selection term.   
4.2 Model estimation and results 
Tables 4.1 to 4.3 present the results for various factors that influence the probability of 
participating in the labour market and being employed, as well as earnings levels for those 
who are employed. Most of the covariates used in this study are dummy variables and for 
those dummies, their reference categories are as follows: 
Marital status: never married 
Education: No formal education 
Location: Rural 
Occupation: Elementary workers 
Sector: Private informal sector 
As mentioned, the models will be estimated separately for men and women. For comparison 
purposes, results will be displayed in the same table for the particular model of interest. 
4.2.1 Labour force participation equation 
Table 4.1 represents the results of the labour force participation equation LFPi = α1Mi + α2Xi + 
εi indicating the decisions that determine participation in the labour market for men and 
women. The simple estimation is given by specification I which shows the participation 
decision in the labour market as a function only of the six marital status indicators (with never 
married as the omitted category). For men, both monogamously and polygamously married 
men are significant at the 1 percent significant level more likely to participate in the labour 
market than men who have never been married. In contrast to widowed men who are 
significantly less likely to participate in the labour market compared to men who have never 
married. The coefficients of cohabiting, separated, and divorced men are statistically 
insignificant. For women, the results are substantially different from that of men. 
Monogamously and polygamously married and widowed women are less likely to participate 
in the labour market compared to women who have never been married. These effects are 
quantitatively very large, especially for the two categories of marriage, and are also highly 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. On the other hand, separated women are likely 
to participate in the labour force than those who have never been married. Cohabiting and 





participate in the labour market. When comparing the results for men and women (see 
appendix A), the results from specification I indicate that the estimates for women in 
monogamous marriages, separated, widowed and divorced differ from that for men at the 0.01 
significance level. The cohabiting variable indicate that the gender difference is not significant. 
 
Table 4.1: Labour force participation equations for men and women 
 Specification I Specification II 
 Male Women Men Women 
Monogamously 
Married 
0.293*** -0.490*** 0.246*** -0.436*** 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.037)    (0.036)    
Polygamously 
Married 
0.332** -0.509*** 0.504*** -0.507*** 
(0.141) (0.144) (0.161)    (0.159)    
Cohabiting 0.231 0.153 -0.035  -0.022   
(0.261) (0.247) (0.279)    (0.278)    
Separated -0.036 0.129** -0.004    0.098    
(0.068) (0.062) (0.078)    (0.071)    
Divorced 0.075 0.227** 0.118 0.171    
(0.161) (0.109) (0.182)    (0.124)    
Widowed -0.109* -0.327*** 0.164**  -0.098** 
(0.061) (0.036) (0.074)    (0.049)    
Primary Education   0.244*** 0.316*** 
  (0.034)    (0.072)    
Secondary Education   0.451*** 0.517*** 
  (0.042)    (0.074)    
Tertiary Education   1.101*** 1.672*** 
  (0.111)    (0.119)    
Age   0.105*** 0.104*** 
  (0.007)    (0.007)    
Age squared   -0.002*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000)    (0.0001)    
Urban   0.714*** 0.802*** 
(0.037) (0.031) 
No. children below 7   -0.077*** -0.099*** 
  (0.01)    (0.014)    
No. children 8-14   -0.046*** -0.085*** 
  (0.014)    (0.014)    
No. adults above 65   -0.134*** -0.094**  
  (0.028)    (0.031)    
No. other employed 
household members 
  0.168*** 0.085*** 
  (0.017)    (0.016)    
Other household income   -0.026** -0.027***    
  (0.011)    (0.008)    
Other household  income 
squared 
  0.001 0.001** 
(0.0001) (0.0002) 
Household production   -0.547*** -0.627*** 
(0.027) (0.031) 
Constant 0.088*** 0.177*** -1.631*** -1.542*** 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.118)    (0.1321)    
No. observations 11613 11893 11178   11511  
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000    0.000    
Source: ILFS (2008). 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  






When additional regressors are added to the model, in specification II, the size of the marital 
status participation rate coefficients for men into the labour market increase considerably but 
there is also some slight declines with some variables, while the significance levels remains 
similar. Thus, the observed characteristics serve to reinforce the differences in participation 
by marital status. Monogamously and polygamously married and widowed men’s coefficients 
remain significant in explaining men’s participation compared to those never married. One 
interesting change is that the coefficient on widowed men switches from being negative and 
significant to positive when controlling for other characteristics. This might be due to the fact 
that, on average, widowed men are less likely to participate, but once there is control for the 
fact that they are older and less educated, than never married men, their chances of 
participating are actually higher. The coefficients for cohabiting, separated and divorced men 
remain insignificant. The addition of other regressors for women changes the significance of 
marital status. However, the magnitude of the difference in participation between never 
married and other women generally declines by a small margin. Now, it is only women in 
monogamously or polygamous marriages or who are widowed that remain significantly less 
likely to participate than women who have never been married. The magnitude of the effect is 
substantially lessened. These changes suggest that women in these marital status categories 
possess other observable characteristics that make them less likely to participate than never 
married women, but that controlling for such characteristics only somewhat explains their 
lower participation. The other marital status indicators show a slight increase in women’s 
probability of participating in the labour market, although not significantly different from that of 
never married women. When comparing the results for men and women (see appendix XX) 
they show that the estimates for women differ from that for men at 0.01 significance level 
looking at those in the following marital statuses; monogamously married, separated, divorced 
and widowed. The other two marital categories (polygamous and cohabiting) indicate that the 
gender differences are not significant. 
The other control variables in the participation equation are not the main focus of this research, 
but they will be discussed briefly below. Education is found to be important in determining 
one’s decision on whether to participate in the labour market: those who participate have better 
educational qualifications than those who do not participate. This finding agrees with that for 
South Africa (Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 2001).  The addition of other characteristics show that 
older individuals are more likely to participate in the labour market, but at a diminishing rate.  
Living in an urban area significantly increases the likelihood of one’s participation in the labour 





The involvement in household production is significant for both men and women and it 
decreases their likelihood of participating in the labour force as compared to those who are 
not participating in household production. This is indeed in line with theoretical predictions. 
The household’s characteristics are represented by covariates for household composition (the 
number of children below age 7, number of children between ages 8-14, number of adults 
above age 65, and other employed household members) and by other household income and 
income squared. The household composition variables are significant for both genders. The 
results are as expected for women, as they show that the presence of children significantly 
reduces participation at 1 percent significant level. It is also surprising that the effect of children 
is also significant and negative for men. However, the effect is much smaller in magnitude for 
men than for women, and this is the case especially so for older children. 
The presence of other employed adults in the household coefficient is positive and significant 
at all levels for males and females. This may indicate that when a household member is 
employed, other members are more likely to learn about employment opportunities, and 
therefore more likely to participate. For example in South Africa, one of the most common way 
in which people learn about employment opportunities is through family members and friends 
(Posel et al, 2014). 
Lastly, presence of elderly adults in the household is also significant and negative for both 
men and women, indicating that the presence of adults above the age of 65 in a household 
deters individuals from participating in the labour force. This maybe because the aged person 
is a pensioner as there is a universal state pension in Lesotho which is received by anyone 
aged 70 and above. Further, for previous public sector employees, retired at the age of 60 
they receive monthly pension.  
4.2.2 Employment equation 
The previous section looked at factors that determine men and women’s labour market 
participation, given the different marital status indicators. This section will retain the sample of 
those who participate in the labour market, and estimate the probability that they find paid 
employment. The results for the employment equation (Ei = β1Mi + β2Zi + μi) are presented in 
tables 4.2, where specification I and II present the simple employment probit that does not 
take into account the selection factor.  
Specification I shows the results of the simple estimation of the differences in employment 
probability based on marital categories (never married being the omitted category) for men 





are significant at the five percent level or better, showing that being a man increases the 
probability of a man being employed compared to those that have never been married. For 
women, only those who are separated or widowed are significantly more likely to be employed 
than women who have never married. Women in all other marital status categories have 
employment probabilities that are not significantly different than never married women. Further 
look at the results from specification I (see appendix B) indicate that separated, divorced, 
widowed and monogamously married coefficients of women differ from that of men at 0.01 
significance level. 
Table 4.2: Employment equations for men and women    
 Specification I Specification II Specification III 
 Men Women    Men Women Men Women 
Monogamously  0.408*** -0.014 0.203*** -0.111**  0.108** 0.147***  
Married (0.036) (0.043) (0.048)    (0.051)    (0.044) (0.046)    
Polygamously 0.400** 0.188 0.083    -0.035    -0.042 0.177    
Married (0.197) (0.255) (0.221)    (0.266)    (0.197) (0.222)    
Cohabiting -0.102 0.181 -0.481    0.131    -0.406 -0.196   
 (0.336) (0.336) (0.354)    (0.369)    (0.315) (0.312)    
Separated 0.214** 0.325*** 0.125    0.187*   0.123 0.141  
 (0.105) (0.088) (0.113)    (0.098)    (0.100) (0.086)    
Divorced 0.671** -0.081 0.489   -0.384*** 0.363 -0.328**  
 (0.279) (0.137) (0.297)    (0.149)    (0.263) (0.132)    
Widowed 0.369*** 0.272*** 0.191    -0.008    0.140 0.081   
 (0.1) (0.056) (0.113)    (0.073)    (0.099) (0.062)    
Age   0.019*** 0.063*** -0.029*** -0.015    
   (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.009) (0.010)    
Agesq   -0.0001  -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0004***   
   (0.0001)    (0.000)    (0.0001) (0.0001)    
Primary education   -0.069    0.046    -0.072 -0.039    
   (0.053)    (0.138)    (0.045) (0.103)    
Secondary education   -0.034    0.246*   0.062 0.026    
   (0.059)    (0.140)    (0.051) (0.105)    
Tertiary education   0.781*** 1.032*** 0.699*** 0.647***   
   (0.134)    (0.170)    (0.124) (0.135)    
Urban area   0.219***   -0.055    -0.079* -0.016    
   (0.043)    (0.057)    (0.043) (0.048)    
Household production 
 
  -0.423*** -0.515*** -0.163*** -0.219*** 
(0.038)    (0.045)    (0.039) (0.046)    
Constant 0.533*** 0.540*** 0.291   -0.562*** 1.479*** 1.129*** 
 (0.027) (0.034) (0.177)    (0.212)    (0.174) (0.204)    




No.observations 6893 5380 6566   5046    11223 11582 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000    0.000    0.000 0.000   
Source: ILFS (2008). 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
* Significant at the 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level, ***Significant at the 1% level. 
 
When additional regressors are included in the employment equation, as shown in 
specification II, the effect of marital status on the probability that men who participate in the 
labour market find a job declines substantially. The coefficient of polygamously married, 
cohabiting, separated, divorced or widowed men become insignificant in employment 





never married men. This is an interesting change, as the results are indeed in line with theory 
that marriage makes men more favourable to employees. Though it would have been 
expected that polygamous marriage would be important in employment determination. It could 
also suggests, that marital status is considered more than one’s individual characteristics.  
Turning to females, there are changes in the observed results. With the addition of other 
characteristics, being monogamously married or divorced significantly decreases the 
probability of one finding employment compared to women who have never been married, with 
the effect being largest for divorced women. The probability of being employed increases for 
separated women as opposed to those never married, but is only significant at 10 percent 
significant level.  
The age and age squared coefficients have expected signs and they are all significant. They 
show that as a person gets older, the probability of them finding employment increases at a 
diminishing rate for both men and women. The age-related increase in the likelihood of finding 
employment is especially large for women. This is further supported by the t-test results (see 
appendix B) specification II, where it is observed that the age coefficient for women differs 
from that of men at the 0.01 significance level. 
The education covariates show that men with tertiary education have a higher chance of being 
employed than those with no education. For women, those with secondary and tertiary 
education are significantly more likely to find employment when compared to women with no 
formal education. The greatest effect is found with tertiary education for both genders.  
The location variable is positive and statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent significance 
levels for men. This means that men living in urban areas are more likely to be employed 
compared to men living in rural areas. For women, living in urban areas plays no role in 
determining employment compared to those in rural areas as the coefficient is insignificant. 
The involvement in household production significantly decreases men and women’s likelihood 
of being employed. One would have expected an insignificant coefficient on men’s household 
production, meaning it would not play any role for men when they seek employment. For 
women, it was expected as there are other duties such as child rearing, cooking and other 
household chores that may prevent them from actively looking for employment. However, 
there is a likelihood that this variable is endogenous. Individuals who cannot find employment 
may be more likely to spend their time in home production as an alternative to paid 
employment. If so, there is a reverse causality which may bias this coefficient. When the 





4.2.3 Employment equation with selection 
The first empirical section of this chapter considered factors that determine participation in the 
labour market and retained the sample of those people who take part in the labour market, 
which was used to estimate the probability that those who participate find employment. Doing 
so assumes that labour force participants are a random sample of all adults. This part of the 
analysis will estimate Ei = β1Mi + β2Zi + λ1 + μi taking into consideration selection into 
participation, using a Heckman selection model. The selection model for those who participate 
is estimated in Table 4.1 and results are shown in Specification III of Table 4.2. Household 
composition and income were treated as exclusion restrictions in the employment equation. 
These variables are seen to influence the decision of whether to participate rather than 
affecting the process of finding a job (Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 2001).  
The discussion will begin with the coefficient rho which is the sample selection effect. Rho is 
the correlation coefficient between the participation and employment equation, measuring the 
sample’s selectivity bias (Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 2001; Veerbek, 2012; & Vartanian, 2009). 
The estimates of rho are negative and significant, which means that the error terms 
(unobserved characteristics) in the two models are negatively correlated to each other. This 
means that there are unobserved characteristics that increase the probability of men and 
women being employed, but which decrease the likelihood of participation. This finding for 
Lesotho is similar to that of Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001) for South Africa. One fails to reject 
that the correlation between the error terms of the two models is non-zero and thus labour 
market participants are a non-random sample and using methods that correct for sample 
selection is important in obtaining unbiased estimates in the employment equation.  
In the sample selection corrected results, only monogamous marriage is significant in 
increasing the probability of being employed for men, compared to men who have never 
married. For women, being monogamously married significantly increases the probability of 
women being employed at 1 percent significance level, while being divorced decreases the 
likelihood of women being employed, compared to women that have never been married. 
When compared to the model that did not control for selection, the marital status findings 
changed little for men, although the size of the effect of monogamous marriage on employment 
is halved. For women, the effect of monogamous marriage changed from negative to positive 
when controlling for selection. The sample of married women is likely to be most affected by 
self-selection, in that such women may choose not to seek work outside the home and rather 
they rely on their husband’s earnings (Lee, 1997; Killewald and Gough, 2010) These results 
suggest that not controlling for women’s selection into the labour force participation seriously 





Although age is not significant in determining employment for women in this model, age 
squared is significant, suggesting a non-linear relationship between age and employment 
probability. For men, both the age variables are significant in determining employment, but the 
signs are the opposite of the previous model. Thus as men get older they are initially less likely 
to find employment, but this probability later rises with age.  
The education covariates show that, having tertiary education significantly increases the 
likelihood of both men and women being employed as compared to those without education. 
One interesting finding is that primary and secondary schooling are not significant in explaining 
the likelihood of men and women finding employment, although they are significant in 
explaining the probability of participating.  
The location results give surprising outcome for men, as the coefficient is negative showing 
that men living in urban areas are significantly less likely to find employment as compared to 
those living in rural areas. This outcome is not what one would have expected, as it can be 
assumed that urban areas have variety of employment opportunities. For women, the location 
variable is insignificant in their employment determination.  
The involvement in household production significantly decreases the probability of men and 
women being employed, which supports findings in the literature, although the effects are 
smaller than in the model without controls for selection.  
4.2.4 Earnings equation 
This section will analyse the effect of marital status for males and females who are employed 
and report a positive earning. The sample includes both wage employed and self-employed 
individuals. Table 4.3 presents the estimates from the earnings equation (3) for males and 
females, estimated using interval regression.  
The results from specification I for men indicate that with the exception of polygamously 
married and cohabiting men, all the marital status coefficients are positive and significant. 
These means that being monogamously married, separated, divorced or widowed increases 
the earnings of employed men compared to their unmarried counterparts. The largest effect 
is for married men, and this could suggest productivity increased derived from marriage or 
favouritism in the labour market towards married men. The results for women show that being 
monogamously married or divorced are significant in increasing earnings compared to 
unmarried women. Women who are cohabiting earn significantly less than never married 
women. These finding are interesting as the literature in chapter two suggested that married 





characteristics, these results show that women earn a premium for marriage, although it is 
much smaller than that of men.  
The t-test results (see appendix C) show that gender difference are significant at 0.01 
significance level for women who are monogamously married, separated and widowed. 






Table 4.3 Earnings equation, by gender  
 Specification I Specification II Specification III 
 Men Women  Men Women  Men  Women         
Monogamously 
married 
0.934*** 0.261*** 0.271*** 0.044 0.222*** 0.222***  
married (0.035) (0.041) (0.038) (0.033) (0.039)    (0.039)    
Polygamously 
married 
1.203 0.346 0.489*** 0.414** 0.443** 0.395**    
married (0.169) (0.246) (0.159) (0.184) (0.170)    (0.188)    
Cohabiting -0.099 -0.607** -0.243 -0.435** -0.247    -0.341    
 (0.373) (0.307) (0.326) (0.212) (0.323)    (0.213)    
Separated 0.213** -0.018 -0.049 -0.084 -0.047    -0.066    
 (0.096) (0.075) (0.082) (0.058) (0.083)    (0.057)    
Divorced 0.649*** 0.243* -0.156 0.050 -0.163    0.058    
 (0.213) (0.139) (0.180) (0.106) (0.179)    (0.105)    
Widowed 0.695*** -0.007 0.172** -0.026 0.156*  0.044    
 (0.086) (0.050) (0.080) (0.045) (0.081)    (0.045)    
Age   0.048*** 0.025*** 0.022** -0.019**    
   (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)    (0.009)    
Age squared   -0.001*** -0.0003*** -0.0001  0.0003***    
   (0.0001) (0.000) (0.0001)    (0.000)    
Primary    0.147*** 0.283** 0.142***    0.256**   
education   (0.041) (0.113) (0.041)    (0.115)    
Secondary    0.391*** 0.489*** 0.395*** 0.454***  
education   (0.046) (0.115) (0.047)    (0.117)    
Tertiary    1.069*** 1.189*** 1.064*** 1.122*** 
education   (0.082) (0.127) (0.082)    (0.129)    
Urban area   -.060** 0.092*** -0.231*** -0.159 
   (0.029) (0.027) (0.042)    (0.039)    
Experience    0.074 0.139*** 0.069    0.119***  
   (0.048) (0.046) (0.048)    (0.046)    
Experience    0.013* -0.008 0.013*   -0.006    
squared   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    (0.008)    
Hours worked   0.011*** 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.017*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    (0.003)    
Hours worked    -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** 
squared   (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002)    (0.000)    
Officials   0.366*** 0.701*** 0.394*** 0.717*** 
   (0.085) (0.096) (0.085)    (0.095)    
Professionals   0.665*** 1.001*** 0.678*** 1,023*** 
   (0.126) (0.095) (0.125)    (0.094)    
Technicians   0.133* 0.460*** 0.171**  0.520*** 
   (0.076) (0.056) (0.076)    (0.056)    
Clerks   0.097 0.293*** 0.097    0.317*** 
   (0.072) (0.049) (0.072)    (0.049)    
Sales   0.123** 0.182*** 0.143**  0.229*** 
   (0.058) (0.051) (0.058)    (0.051)    
Trade   -0.187 0.094 -0.199    0.115    
   (0.165) (0.153) (0.172)    (0.158)    





In specification II, other regressors which are important in the determination of earnings for 
individuals are added. These additional regressors include personal productivity 
characteristics, such as education and experience, as well as job characteristics, such as 
occupation and working hours. The inclusion of these regressors leads to a decline in both the 
magnitude and the significance of the effect of marital status on women and men’s earnings. 
For men, the coefficients of monogamously, polygamously married and widowed are 
significant in increasing earnings compared to never married men. The results for women 
show that polygamously married have significantly higher earnings than their unmarried 
counterparts. While, cohabiting women still earn less than their never married counterparts. 
These changes suggest that marital status is correlated with productivity and job 
characteristics for both men and women, such that not controlling for these characteristics 
overstated the difference in earnings between individuals with different marital statuses. 
Results from appendix C show that gender difference are insignificant for those in polygamous 
marriages and cohabiting. Estimates of women in all other marital categories (monogamously 
married, separated, divorced and widowed) differ from those of men at 0.01 significance level. 
The age covariates have expected signs and significance for both men and women. As one 
gets older, they are significantly likely to earn more though at a diminishing rate. The education 
coefficients for men and women are significant and positive showing that having a primary, 
secondary and tertiary education increases earnings for men and women compared to their 
counterparts without formal education. These findings for Lesotho if the labour market 
functions properly are expected. The results are also are in line with theory and other empirical 
studied have found that there is a positive relationship between schooling and earnings (Kerr 
and Teal, 2008)  





  Men Women  Men Women  Men Men 
   (0.035) (0.051) (0.035)    (0.050)    
Machine   0.362*** -0.038 0.362*** -0.052    
   (0.045) (0.043) (0.045)    (0.043)    
Armed forces   0.499*** 0.760 0.481*** 0.762    
   (0.157) (0.512) (0.157)    (0.503)    
Public sector   0.715*** 0.654*** 0.704*** 0.653*** 
   (0.055) (0.049) (0.055)    (0.049)    
Private formal    0.746*** 0.470*** 0.728*** 0.468*** 
sector   (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)    (0.031)    
Rho     -0.489*** -0.603*** 
     (0.087)    (0.069)    
Constant  6.356*** 6.449*** 4.3665.340*** 4.379*** 5.174*** 5.622*** 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.181) (0.186) (0.233)    (0.232)    
No. observations 4659 3479 4231 3109 4137   3062    
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    0.000 
Source: ILFS (2008). 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  






Living in an urban area show unexpected effect on earnings as it is shows that men living in 
urban areas are significantly likely to earn less than those in rural areas.  For females, those 
living in urban areas significantly (1 percent significance level) more likely to earn more than 
those in rural area. The amount of potential work experience (derived from the years that one 
has been engaged in their particular job as per the questionnaire questioning) that men have 
is not important in explaining their earnings. For women, experience has a positive and 
significant linear effect on earnings. The hours worked variables are significant at all levels for 
both men and women. Increasing the hours a man or woman works will lead to an increase, 
at a decreasing rate, in his/her monthly earnings.  
The results by various occupation classifications reveal that for men who are in official, 
professional, technicians, craft, sales machinery and armed forces positions earn significantly 
more than their counterparts employed in elementary occupations. However, semi-skilled 
occupations (trade and clerks) are not important in the determination of earnings.  Women 
employed in craft earn significantly lower earnings than women in elementary occupations. 
This type of occupation is usually male dominated and require much physical effort, so women 
in them usually are likely to be doing administrative work that does not pay well (Kanellopoulos 
and Mavromaras, 1999). In contrast, those in official, professional, technical, clerks and sales 
occupations earn significantly higher wages than those in elementary positions. One would 
have expected that the coefficient on machinery occupations would be significant for women, 
as the highest employer in Lesotho is the private sector dominated by the textile sector. 
Majority employed in that sector are women.   
Working in the public or private-formal sector significantly increase the earnings of employed 
men and women, relative to those working in private informal sector at 1 percent significance 
level.  
4.2.5 Earnings equation with selection 
Table 4.3, specification III presents the results for equation (5) for employed men and women 
by marital status, after controlling for sequential selection into labour force participation and 
employment. The full results of the Heckman probit model of the earnings equation are found 
in appendix (XX).The results do not differ much compared to the previous section where 
earnings were estimated without sample selection as results are showing in specification II. 
Following Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001), the exclusion restriction here is other household 
income, which is assumed to affect the probability of obtaining employment, but not the value 





Starting with the sample selection effect (rho), the coefficient is significant and negative for 
both men and women, showing that there was significant sampling bias. The coefficient shows 
that wage earners are not a random selection of labour market participants, and justifies the 
use of the selection model in this section. The negative coefficients also suggest that the wage 
distribution is biased downwards compared to the case where individuals select themselves 
into employment randomly. Again, these selection findings are similar to those of Bhorat and 
Leibbrandt (2001) for South Africa. 
The marital status covariates reveal that for men in monogamously and polygamous married 
and widowed have significantly higher earnings compared to never married men. For women 
the results show that those in monogamous and polygamous marriages, significantly likely to 
earn higher wages compared to never married women. The other marital coefficients are 
insignificant. The main difference from the results without controlling for selection is that here, 
monogamous marriage is positively associated with earnings for both men and women.  
The educational covariates are significant at 1 percent level in increasing the earnings of men 
and women who are employed and report positive earnings compared to those who are 
without formal education. The coefficients have the expected signs and significance, with little 
change from specification II. 
The location variable’s effect has changed substantially from the equation (3) specification II, 
with the coefficient still being significant and negative for men but increased magnitude in its 
effect on earnings, whereas for women it is insignificant. This suggests that men living in rural 
areas earn more than those living in urban areas, after controlling for their other observable 
characteristics. The only other substantive change, compared to specification II, is that men 
who work as technicians earn more than elementary workers, although only significantly so at 
the ten percent level. Although, there is a significant sample selection effect, controlling for 
selection does not substantially change the estimates of the relationship between the 
observable characteristics and earnings, other than the effect of monogamous marriage on 
women’s earnings.  
The amount of potential work experience that men have is not important in explaining their 
earnings. For women, experience has a positive and significant with a diminishing effect on 
earnings. Like in specification II, hours worked variables are significant at all levels for both 
genders. An additional hour a man or woman works will lead to an increase, at a decreasing 





The results by various occupations remain the same as those from specification II. The 
significances and signs of the coefficients does not change. The only change that is observed, 
is an increase the magnitude that the coefficients have on earnings.  
Further, men and women employed in the public or private-formal sector significantly earn 
higher than those working in the private informal sector.  
4.3 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter set out to investigate the relationship between marital status and labour market 
outcomes using regression analysis. It began by outlining basic labour supply models that 
exist in the literature and the methodological approach that was used in the study. A three 
stage sequential labour market selection approach was used, which began by labour market 
participation, then modelled employment and lastly earnings.  
The results show that not all marital statuses are important in determining an individual’s 
outcomes in the labour market, although at least some of the marital indicators are significant 
in each stage. Differing results are found in each stage of the labour market and also by 
gender. In the participation equation, only monogamous, polygamous marriages and 
widowhood are found to be important in determining participation for both men and women, 
even after controlling for other observable factors. The employment equations show 
monogamous marriage positively determine men’s employment and for women, monogamous 
marriage and divorce affect the probability of being employed, though negatively. The earnings 
results shows that men in monogamous and polygamous marriages and widowed have a 
positive impact on earnings. The earning results for women reveal that being in a polygamous 
marriage increase the earnings, while cohabiting reduces earnings. These findings for Lesotho 
support the arguments in the literature that marriage may increase men’s productivity or be a 
desirable characteristic to employers as it can be seen that married men earn significantly 
higher than other men. Even in the presences of many other productive or personal control 
variables such as experience and occupation, the wage effect due to marriage still persist.  
For women, the model that does not control for selection reveals that only polygamous 
marriage raises earnings significantly, while cohabitation lowers earnings.   
The significant sample selection terms show that there was selection bias in both the 
employment and earnings equations which needed to be corrected. The results thus show 
that there is indeed a systematic difference between those who choose to participate and 
those who do not, and between those who find employment and those who do not. These 
findings correspond with those for South Africa. Despite this result, however, there are not 





possible explanation for such differences being small is the extent to which the chosen 
characteristics are able to control for selection and the validity of the exclusion restrictions. 
Although South Africa and Lesotho’s labour markets are similar, it is possible that variables 
other than those used here, which were adopted from Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001), might 
perform better in the analysis. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
and further exploration of it is left for future research. Also, due to a lack of suitable exclusion 
restrictions in the ILFS data, this dissertation did not attempt to estimate selection into marital 
status, and this issue is also left to future research. 
After controlling for selection into the various labour market states, it is observed that most of 
the marital status classification are insignificant in either determining employment or earnings. 
When taking account of selection in the employment equation, results showed that for men 
selection decreases the magnitude in which marital status has on the likelihood of being 
employed. With and without selection, divorced men are less likely to be employed compared 
to their never married counterparts. The earning equations also showed similar results to those 
of the employment equation. The only difference in this case was of men with and without 
sample selection, men in monogamous and polygamous marriages earn more than those that 
have never been married. Other marital classifications are insignificant. For women, the 
earnings equation with and without sample selection shows that women in polygamous 
marriages earn more than those who have never been married.  
Across all three equations, results show that personal, productive and occupational 
characteristics are also important in determining participation, employment and earnings.  
When accounting for sample selection, similar results are from regression without selections 
are found. Therefore, it can be concluded that this chapter showed that the observed marriage 
premium for men cannot only be explained by marriage. Rather it is explained by looking at 
individual, household and labour market characteristics that are significant in explaining the 
earning gap between those who are married and the unmarried.  
The final chapter will conclude the study, while also giving recommendations for future 










Chapter 5: Conclusion and recommendations 
The main purpose of this dissertation was to assess and analyse the impact of marital status 
on men and women’s decisions to participate in the labour market, their employability and 
earnings in Lesotho. While, these relationships have been widely investigated in developed 
countries, there is more limited evidence in developing countries, and there are no existing 
studies which examine these issues in Lesotho.  
The first objective of the study was to examine how economic theory accounts for possible 
differences in labour market outcomes on the basis of marital status. The study therefore 
began by reviewing existing theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of marital status 
on participation, employment and earnings for men and women. The literature reviewed the 
theory of labour participation and focused on the economic theory of marriage, gains to 
marriage, marriage market, and the effects of marital status on earnings for men and women. 
The theoretical literature reviewed here shows that people’s decision to participate in the 
labour market is the outcome of a trade-off between time spent on work and consuming 
leisure. For women, time spent on home production also factors into this decision. The 
literature on marital status and its relationship to earnings argued that a combination of 
increased productivity, specialisation and discrimination contribute to the widely observed 
differentials in earnings among married and single men. With women, the theoretical direction 
of effect of marital status on earnings was more difficult to predict 
The empirical literature reviewed studies from both developed and developing countries. The 
studies found marital status has a significant effect on labour market outcomes for both men 
and women. In particular, married men participate more in the labour market than unmarried 
men. With women, single women had the highest participation rates in most cases. 
The study went on to attempt to test the applicability of these results to a developing country 
case, namely Lesotho. For the empirical analysis, the Integrated Labour Force Survey (ILFS) 
of May 2008 was used and the sample was restricted to individuals above the age 16 who 
were currently not students. The second objective of the study was to determine whether, on 
average, differences in labour market participation, employment and earnings exist between 
individuals with different marital statuses, and if so, whether these differences vary by gender. 
The descriptive statistics, which were separated by gender and marital status, the study found 
that the factors that determine labour market access may differ substantially by gender and 
marital status when looking at educational characteristics. The geographical distribution 
revealed that the sub-sample that was found most in the urban areas were the employed 





employment. Lastly, the distribution of earnings showed that men are represented more than 
women in high paying earnings.  
The final objective of the dissertation was to assess the extent of the differences in labour 
market outcomes by marital status persist, for both men and women, after controlling for 
observable characteristics and sample selection. This objective was met in Chapter 4 through 
the use of regression analysis, with the methodology used involving a three-phase procedure 
for selection in the labour market.  
The labour force participation results showed that not all marital statuses are important in the 
determination of participation. Only being monogamously married, polygamously married or 
widowed were found to be important in determining participation for men and women. 
However, the effects of marital status work in opposite directions for the two genders: men in 
these categories are more likely to participate, while women are less likely to participate, than 
those who have never been married. These findings for Lesotho are in line with theory and 
findings elsewhere, in that married men tend to specialise in market work, while women tend 
to specialise in home production rather than participating in the labour market, (Becker, 1981; 
Korenman and Neumark, 1991).  
The employment equation, without controlling for selection into participation, showed that 
majority of marital categories are insignificant in determining employment for both men and 
women. Men in monogamous marriages are the significantly more likely to be employed, 
whereas for women they are less likely to be employed is they are monogamously married or 
divorced. Again, however, the effects differ by gender: married men are more likely to be 
employed than those who have never been married, while the converse is true for women. 
The literature tends not to focus on this stage of the labour market process, as participation 
and employment are typically treated synonymously in developed country studies. However, 
this research has shown that marital status is an important correlate of employment for both 
genders.  
The earnings analysis showed that important marital status indicators for men were 
monogamous and polygamous marriage, both of which raised earnings substantially, as well 
as being widowed, which reduced earnings somewhat. For women, the results revealed very 
modest relationships between earnings and marital status, with polygamously married women 
earning more and cohabiting women less than those who have never married, although not at 
high levels of significance.  
When the sample selection estimation method was applied to the employment and earnings 





were negatively and significantly correlated in both models. This finding supported that for 
South Africa (Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 2001). It is therefore important to control for non-random 
selection into labour market states, in order to prevent biased estimates. After controlling for 
selection, the effects of most of the covariates do not change very substantially. The largest 
changes were observed for the marital status indicators, and especially so for monogamous 
marriage and for women. After controlling for selection, women who are monogamously 
married are significantly more likely to be employed than women who have never been 
married, with the effect being even larger than for men. The literature has suggested that self-
selection into labour force participation is non-random for women who are married, and these 
findings support this literature (Mincer, 1962 & Lee, 1997). Thus, after controlling for the type 
of women who selected themselves into participation, it does not appear that potential 
employers in Lesotho discriminated against hiring women who were married.  
In the earnings equation, controlling for selection into participation and employment decreased 
the marital wage premium for men, but substantially increased it for women. Both men and 
women who were in either monogamous or polygamous marriages earned more than their 
never married counterparts. This supports the argument that increased productivity and 
specialisation in a marriage may enable individuals to earn more. Of particular interest is the 
fact that the marriage wage premiums are larger for polygamous marriage than for 
monogamous marriage for both genders, although especially so for men. Being able to 
distinguish between these two marriage types is one of the key advantages of using the 
Lesotho data set for such a study, in comparison to South African and other data. This finding 
supports the specialisation hypothesis, as both men and women who are polygamously 
married are likely to have other adults in the households with whom to share household duties. 
Similarly, employers may treat polygamous marriage as an indicator that an individual will be 
able to be particularly committed to their market work.  
In summary, this dissertation gave a detailed understanding of the functioning of the labour 
market in Lesotho. It shed light on the impact of household, personal and occupational 
characteristics on participation, employment and earnings. It particularly showed that marital 
status plays an important role in explaining differences in labour market outcomes between 
individuals, and that being monogamously married is advantageous, most especially for men 
However, despite these interesting findings, there are a number of limitations to the study. 
First, it is necessary to select variables to act as exclusion restrictions in order to use the 
Heckman selection method. The choice of such variables is limited by the data available. This 
study chose to follow the variables chosen by Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001), using a similar 





rather than on the econometric issues related to exclusion restrictions. However, a more 
detailed study of such issues is an avenue for future exploration with these data. A second 
limitation to the study is that, since the data are cross-sectional, it is not possible to control for 
unobservable characteristics that may affect labour market outcomes. While the use of the 
Heckman selection model attempts to control for the factors that determine an individual’s 
choice of labour market state, the outcomes are limited by the availability of variables to use 
as exclusion restrictions. If panel data were to be collected, this would allow for an improved 
method of control for unobservable characteristics. Another issue relating to an individual’s 
choice of labour market state is that, especially for women, marital status and fertility are likely 
to be endogenous in labour force participation equations. That is, women may make decisions 
about when to have children and how many children to have in conjunction with their decisions 
about labour market participation, or in response to an inability to find work. This study has 
not attempted to control for this endogeneity, as doing so would require the identification of 
instruments for the presence or number of children. Nonetheless, it is important to 
acknowledge that the presence of such endogeneity may bias the results, especially for 
women who are married. 
A final limitation with the interpretation of the results is in relation to the data set used. As much 
as the ILFS 2008 is appropriate for a study of the labour force or labour market related 
activities in Lesotho, the frequency of the survey is a challenge. For instance, the survey used 
is the most recent one conducted, and the previous survey was conducted in 1999. There is 
a substantial lag between data collection and the time it is released to the public, as well as 
these long lags between surveys. This may result in an out of date picture of the labour market. 
With regards to this particular study, the picture painted shows the situation in Lesotho in 2008. 
The country’s economy was particularly hard-hit by the financial crisis, but the effects of this 
do not reflect in the current study. One of the recommendations of the research is therefore 
for the Bureau of Statistics Lesotho to conduct more regular surveys of the labour market.   
There is much further research to be conducted in this area. In Lesotho, the culture of bridal 
fees is quite widely practiced. Future studies combining qualitative and quantitative research 
could analyse the effect of bridal price on marriage and men’s decisions in the labour market. 
It would be of interest to look at the effect that bridal fees have on men’s likelihood to work, 
their hours of work and whether they have increased productivity in order to enable them to 
marry, rather than marriage causing productivity to rise.  
In summary, it is hoped that this study will spark interest in further labour market related studies 
in Lesotho. These studies have potential to explain various labour market characteristics, 
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Appendix A: Labour force participation equations for men and women; T-tests 
 Specification I Specification II 
 Male Women Men Women 
Monogamously 
Married 
0.293 -0.490*** 0.246*** -0.436*** 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.037)    (0.036)    
Polygamously 
Married 
0.332 -0.509* 0.504*** -0.507 
(0.141) (0.144) (0.161)    (0.159)    
Cohabiting 0.231 0.153 -0.035  -0.022   
(0.261) (0.247) (0.279)    (0.278)    
Separated -0.036 0.129*** -0.004    0.098 ***   
(0.068) (0.062) (0.078)    (0.071)    
Divorced 0.075 0.227*** 0.118 0.171***    
(0.161) (0.109) (0.182)    (0.124)    
Widowed -0.109 -0.327*** 0.164**  -0.098** 
(0.061) (0.036) (0.074)    (0.049)    
Primary Education   0.244*** 0.316*** 
  (0.034)    (0.072)    
Secondary Education   0.451*** 0.517*** 
  (0.042)    (0.074)    
Tertiary Education   1.101*** 1.672*** 
  (0.111)    (0.119)    
Age   0.105*** 0.104*** 
  (0.007)    (0.007)    
Age squared   -0.002*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000)    (0.0001)    
Urban   0.714*** 0.802*** 
(0.037) (0.031) 
No. children below 7   -0.077*** -0.099 
  (0.01)    (0.014)    
No. children 8-14   -0.046*** -0.085 
  (0.014)    (0.014)    
No. adults above 65   -0.134*** -0.094**  
  (0.028)    (0.031)    
No. other employed 
household members 
  0.168*** 0.085** 
  (0.017)    (0.016)    
Other household income   -0.026** -0.027***    
  (0.011)    (0.008)    
Other household  income 
squared 
  0.001 0.001*** 
(0.0001) (0.0002) 
Household production   -0.547*** -0.627*** 
(0.027) (0.031) 
No. observations 11613 11893 11178   11511  
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000    0.000    
Source:  ILFS (2008). 
Notes: The samples include all males and females aged 15-65 years. ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates for 






Appendix B: Employment equations for men and women; T-test  
 Specification I Specification II 
 Men Women    Men Women 
Monogamously  0.408 -0.014*** 0.203 -0.111*** 
married (0.036) (0.043) (0.048)    (0.051)    
Polygamously 0.400 0.188 0.083    -0.035    
married (0.197) (0.255) (0.221)    (0.266)    
Cohabiting -0.102 0.181 -0.481    0.131    
 (0.336) (0.336) (0.354)    (0.369)    
Separated 0.214 0.325*** 0.125    0.187*** 
 (0.105) (0.088) (0.113)    (0.098)    
Divorced 0.671 -0.081*** 0.489   -0.384*** 
 (0.279) (0.137) (0.297)    (0.149)    
Widowed 0.369 0.272*** 0.191    -0.008*** 
 (0.1) (0.056) (0.113)    (0.073)    
Age   0.019 0.063*** 
   (0.010)    (0.010)    
Agesq   -0.0001  -0.001*** 
   (0.0001)    (0.000)    
Primary education   -0.069    0.046***    
   (0.053)    (0.138)    
Secondary education   -0.034    0.246***   
   (0.059)    (0.140)    
Tertiary education   0.781 1.032*** 
   (0.134)    (0.170)    
Urban area   0.219   -0.055***    
   (0.043)    (0.057)    
Household production 
 
  -0.423 -0.515*** 
(0.038)    (0.045)    
No.observations 6893 5380 6566   5046    
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000    0.000    
Source:  ILFS (2008). 
Notes: The samples include all males and females aged 15-65 years. ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates for 





















Appendix C: Earnings equations for men and women; T-test 
 Specification I Specification II 
 Men Women  Men Women  
Monogamously 0.934 0.261*** 0.271 0.044*** 
married (0.035) (0.041) (0.038) (0.033) 
Polygamously  1.203 0.346 0.489 0.414 
married (0.169) (0.246) (0.159) (0.184) 
Cohabiting -0.099 -0.607 -0.243 -0.435 
 (0.373) (0.307) (0.326) (0.212) 
Separated 0.213 -0.018*** -0.049 -0.084*** 
 (0.096) (0.075) (0.082) (0.058) 
Divorced 0.649 0.243** -0.156 0.050*** 
 (0.213) (0.139) (0.180) (0.106) 
Widowed 0.695 -0.007*** 0.172 -0.026*** 
 (0.086) (0.050) (0.080) (0.045) 
Age   0.048 0.025** 
   (0.008) (0.007) 
Age squared   -0.001 -0.0003** 
   (0.0001) (0.000) 
Primary    0.147 0.283*** 
education   (0.041) (0.113) 
Secondary    0.391 0.489*** 
education   (0.046) (0.115) 
Tertiary    1.069 1.189*** 
education   (0.082) (0.127) 
Urban area   -.060 0.092*** 
   (0.029) (0.027) 
Experience    0.074 0.139*** 
   (0.048) (0.046) 
Experience    0.013 -0.008*** 
squared   (0.008) (0.008) 
Hours worked   0.011 0.018*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Hours worked    -0.0001 -0.0002*** 
squared   (0.000) (0.000) 
Officials   0.366 0.701*** 
   (0.085) (0.096) 
Professionals   0.665 1.001*** 
   (0.126) (0.095) 
Technicians   0.133 0.460*** 
   (0.076) (0.056) 
Clerks   0.097 0.293*** 
   (0.072) (0.049) 
Sales   0.123 0.182*** 
   (0.058) (0.051) 
Trade   -0.187 0.094 
   (0.165) (0.153) 







Source:  ILFS (2008). 
Notes: The samples include all males and females aged 15-65 years. ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates for 























 Specification I 
 
Specification II 
  Men Women  Men Women  
   (0.035) (0.051) 
Machine   0.362 -0.038*** 
   (0.045) (0.043) 
     
Armed forces   0.499 0.760*** 
   (0.157) (0.512) 
Public sector   0.715 0.654*** 
   (0.055) (0.049) 
Private formal    0.746 0.470*** 
sector   (0.029) (0.031) 
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